



EZRA POUND’S COPYRIGHT STATUTE: PERPETUAL RIGHTS 





This Article explores the historical and present-day significance of proposals 
for copyright reform advanced in 1918 by the controversial American poet, Ezra 
Pound.  These proposals have never been discussed by legal scholars and have 
received but scant attention from literary scholars.  Yet, like William Wordsworth 
and Mark Twain, whose efforts to reform copyright law are much better known, 
Pound is a major writer whose views shed considerable light on the state of 
copyright law and the conditions of authorship in his time.  Pound’s proposed 
statute—offered as a “cure” for American book piracy—begins by making authors’ 
copyrights exclusive and perpetual, and goes on, surprisingly, to introduce broad 
compulsory-license provisions that would prevent authors and their heirs from 
interfering with later efforts to disseminate authors’ works and require publishers only to 
pay a fixed royalty on sales.  The tension in Pound’s proposal between a perpetual, 
exclusive copyright and expansive compulsory licenses shows him to be an inheritor 
of two legal and economic traditions: on the one hand, a Lockean and Romantic 
belief in a strong property rule grounded in an author’s natural rights and unique 
personality, and, on the other, an anti-monopoly, free-trade preference for a 
liability rule that would encourage wide dissemination of affordable works to serve 
the public interest.  As the author of such a dual-purpose proposal, Pound emerges 
as remarkably and presciently alert to the dangers currently posed by lengthy 
copyright terms unaccompanied by limitations that adequately protect the public.  
Today, the estates of James Joyce, T.S. Eliot, Marianne Moore, Samuel Beckett, 
and other modernist authors use extended copyrights to discourage or control use of 
those authors’ works by scholars, critics, and others.  Pound’s perpetual, royalty-
based copyright would, in principle, have removed or reduced such obstacles to the study 
and enjoyment of modernist authors.  Moreover, Pound’s draft statute anticipates 
recent proposals by Richard Posner, Lawrence Lessig, and others for mitigating the 
conflict between the lengthy copyright monopoly and the needs of the public. 
                                                                                                                            
 * Associate Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law; B.A. Lawrence University; 
M.A., Ph.D. Princeton University; J.D. Yale University.  I would like to thank the following 
individuals for their valuable comments on earlier drafts: Charles W. Adams, William Brockman, 
Ron Bush, Lars Engle, Peter Hirtle, Dennis S. Karjala, Carlton Larson, Paul Saint-Amour, and 
Richard Sieburth.  I also wish to thank the University of Tulsa College of Law for summer 
research funding that assisted with the completion of this Article, as well as Ryan Welner for his 
excellent work as research assistant.  




I. POUND’S COPYRIGHT STATUTE AND LEGALIZED AMERICAN BOOK PIRACY...........1782 
II. POUND’S COPYRIGHT STATUTE: TEXT AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES ...................1788 
A. The Text ............................................................................................................1788 
B. Historical and Philosophical Influences ...........................................................1797 
1. Genius, Intellectual Labor, and Oil Stock................................................1798 
2. Nineteenth-Century Royalty Schemes  
and Anti-Monopoly Reform .....................................................................1803 
III. LITERARY IMPLICATIONS OF POUND’S PROPOSED STATUTE ....................................1807 
A. International Copyright and Communication Among Nations .....................1807 
B. Competing With the Dead: Copyright and the Public Domain .....................1810 
C. Significant Omissions From Pound’s Statute....................................................1814 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF HEIRS AND LONG COPYRIGHTS....................................................1819 
A. Pound’s Prescience.............................................................................................1820 
B. Recent Proposals for Balancing Long Copyrights  





In mid-September 1918, an independent American army under the 
command of General John J. Pershing struck a swift and decisive blow against 
German positions at the St. Mihiel salient in northeastern France.1  Catching 
the Germans in the act of abandoning the salient, Pershing’s forces, assisted 
by French colonial troops and strong aircraft cover, quickly overran the 
enemy position and recaptured the fortified area, which had been in German 
hands for four years.2  The success of the Americans, who had been regarded 
as inexperienced latecomers to the European conflagration, boosted Allied 
morale and persuaded Pershing and Allied Commander Marshal Foch that 
American doughboys had the fighting ability to make a difference in the war.3 
Among those who welcomed the news of the victory was Ezra Pound, 
the American expatriate poet who had been living in London since 1908.  
Brash and outspoken, Pound had made no secret of his detestation of the 
                                                                                                                            
 1. See JOHN H. MORROW, JR., THE GREAT WAR: AN IMPERIAL HISTORY 249–50 (2004); 
David R. Woodward, The Military Role of the United States in World War I, in THE AMERICAN 
MILITARY TRADITION FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 127, 145–46 (John M. Carroll & 
Colin F. Baxter eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
 2. See MORROW, supra note 1, at 249–50. 
 3. See JAMES L. STOKESBURY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WORLD WAR I, at 286–87 (1981); 
ROBERT H. ZIEGER, AMERICA’S GREAT WAR: WORLD WAR I AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
99–100 (2000). 
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Great War, which he frequently referred to as “Armageddon.”4  Several of his 
friends and fellow artists had gone to the conflict, and some had not 
returned.5  In a poem published not long after the war, Pound lamented the 
“[y]oung blood and high blood, / fair cheeks, and fine bodies” that had been 
sacrificed “[f]or a botched civilization.”6  His sense of the waste and futility of 
war, combined with a growing belief that wars were created for profit by pow-
erful international banking interests, fed a bitterness that eventually caused 
him to lose faith in the efficacy of liberal democracies.7 
                                                                                                                            
 4. See, e.g., Ezra Pound, A Shake Down, LITTLE REV., Aug. 1918, at 9, 11, reprinted in 3 
EZRA POUND’S POETRY AND PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS TO PERIODICALS 145, 147 (Lea Baechler et 
al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter POETRY AND PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS] (“As Armageddon has only too 
clearly shown, national qualities are the great gods of the present . . . .”). 
 5. Pound’s friends, the French sculptor and artist Henri Gaudier-Brzeska and the English 
philosopher and poet T.E. Hulme, were killed in action in 1915 and 1917, respectively.  See EZRA 
POUND AND DOROTHY SHAKESPEAR: THEIR LETTERS: 1909–1914, at 345–47 (Omar Pound & A. 
Walton Litz eds., 1984). 
 6. EZRA POUND, Hugh Selwyn Mauberley (Contacts and Life) (1920), reprinted in PERSONAE: 
THE SHORTER POEMS OF EZRA POUND 183, 188 (Lea Baechler & A. Walton Litz eds., rev. ed. 1990). 
 7. The story of Pound’s disenchantment with democratic societies is a tragic one.  Throughout 
the 1930s, his journalism and correspondence grew increasingly anti-Semitic as he more and more 
associated the problems of modern political and economic systems with what he called international 
“usury” and the bankers’ conspiracy that he imagined sustained it.  See generally Robert Spoo, 
Introduction to EZRA AND DOROTHY POUND: LETTERS IN CAPTIVITY, 1945–1946, at 1–2 (Omar Pound 
& Robert Spoo eds., 1999) [hereinafter LETTERS IN CAPTIVITY].  In 1928, Pound moved to Italy and 
came to embrace the charismatic fascism of Benito Mussolini.  See id.; see also generally HUMPHREY 
CARPENTER, A SERIOUS CHARACTER: THE LIFE OF EZRA POUND 457–58, 489–93 (1988) 
(discussing Pound’s admiration for Mussolini).  By 1940, he was broadcasting over Rome Radio in 
support of the Duce, and he continued to do so even after the United States entered World War II 
on the side of the Allies.  During his radio talks, he held forth on the history of money, the 
supposed evils of international finance and “Jew-ruin’d England,” and savagely denounced 
Winston Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and their policies.  LETTERS IN CAPTIVITY, supra, at 
2–4; see also CARPENTER, supra, at 583–97 (describing Pound’s radio broadcasts).  Pound’s 
broadcasts did not go unnoticed by the U.S. Department of Justice.  When Italy fell to the Allies 
in 1945, he was captured and held on charges of treason against the United States.  After a 
Washington, D.C. jury found him mentally unfit to stand trial, he was confined to a federal 
mental institution for the next twelve years.  See generally LETTERS IN CAPTIVITY, supra, at 4–36; 
CARPENTER, supra, at 750–53.  Commentators have found Pound’s prejudice and fascist politics 
difficult to reconcile with his achievements as one of the twentieth century’s greatest poets and 
translators.  See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, AMERICA ON TRIAL: INSIDE THE LEGAL BATTLES 
THAT TRANSFORMED OUR NATION 297 (2004) (“Ezra Pound was a great poet with perverse and 
bizarre opinions about world politics.  Like many others in the 1930s and 1940s, Pound attributed 
the ills of the universe to a worldwide ‘Jewish conspiracy.’”); JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD 
DELGADO, HOW LAWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY: A PROFESSION FAILS ITS CREATIVE MINDS, at xii 
(2005) (describing Pound as “this country’s foremost modernist poet” and a person who “embraced 
bizarre economic theories and became an admirer of Mussolini and Italian fascism”); Ezra Pound 
May Escape Trial and Be Allowed to Go to Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1958, at 16, reprinted in A 
CASEBOOK ON EZRA POUND 128 (William Van O’Connor & Edward Stone eds., 1959) (“Pound, 
regarded by many critics as among the greatest American poets, was indicted for treason because 
of pro-Fascist activities in Italy during World War II.”). 
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But in September 1918, with Pershing’s brilliant stroke at St. Mihiel 
fresh in the news, Pound could not conceal his patriotic pride.  Writing in 
the British periodical The New Age, he hailed the battle as a “magnificent 
and epic incident” that might smooth the way for warmer relations and better 
understanding between Britain and the United States.8  Such an entente was 
critical now, Pound felt, because significant legal and bureaucratic obstacles 
still stood in the way of full and free interaction between the two nations.  
Chief among these obstacles, he believed, were the copyright laws of the two 
countries, especially America’s “thieving copyright law,” as he would later call 
it.9  In his New Age article, entitled “Copyright and Tariff,” Pound declared: 
The present American copyright regulations tend to keep all English and 
Continental authors in a state of irritation with something American—
they don’t quite know what, but there is a reason for irritation.  There is 
a continuous and needless bother about the prevention of literary piracy, a 
need for agents, and agents’ vigilance, and the whole matter produces 
annoyance, and ultimately tends to fester public opinion.10 
Insisting that even an American victory on the Western Front was no lasting 
remedy for the strained relations between Britain and his native country, 
Pound called for a “cure” that only a new law of “reciprocal copyright” could 
bring about.11  “The cure must be effected now,” he declared, “now while the 
two countries are feeling amiable.”12 
Pound had been profoundly dissatisfied with the copyright law of the 
United States as it stood in the early part of the twentieth century.  He con-
sidered it to be a hindrance to authorship and an open and cynical invitation 
to literary piracy of foreign works,13 or what earlier critics had called 
“bookaneering.”14  No true cultural bond could exist between Britain and the 
                                                                                                                            
 8. See Ezra Pound, Copyright and Tariff, NEW AGE, Oct. 3, 1918, at 363, 363, reprinted in 3 
POETRY AND PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 4, at 208, 208. 
 9. See Ezra Pound, Letter to the Editor, Pound for President?, NATION, Dec. 14, 1927, at 
684, 685, reprinted in 4 POETRY AND PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 4, at 393, 393. 
 10. Pound, supra note 8, at 208.  In the same article, Pound railed against the American book tariff 
as another hindrance to amity with foreign nations.  Id. at 209.  Pound’s views on the book tariff, though in 
many ways consistent with his attitudes toward copyright law, are beyond the scope of this Article.  Id. 
 11. See id. at 208, 209. 
 12. Id. at 208. 
 13. For a discussion of Pound’s criticisms of the U.S. copyright law, see Robert Spoo, Note, 
Copyright Protectionism and Its Discontents: The Case of James Joyce’s Ulysses in America, 108 YALE 
L.J. 633, 633–34, 641–42 (1998).  See also EZRA POUND AND SENATOR BRONSON CUTTING: A 
POLITICAL CORRESPONDENCE, 1930–1935, at 28–29 (E.P. Walkiewicz & Hugh Witemeyer eds., 
1995) [hereinafter POUND AND CUTTING] (discussing Pound’s interest in international copyright 
and in efforts to amend American copyright law). 
 14. See, e.g., THOMAS HOOD, Copyright and Copywrong, Letter II, in PROSE AND VERSE pt. 
2, at 83, 84 (New York, Wiley & Putnam 1845) (“[I]f a work be of temporary interest it shall 
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United States, he believed, until the copyright laws of the two nations were 
amended to provide better protection for foreign authors.  Convinced that he could 
do a better job than the legislators, Pound used the pages of The New Age to 
“set down a sketch of what the copyright law ought to be, and what dangers 
should be guarded against.”15 
This “sketch” was more than a poet’s florid wish for a better world; it was 
a set of detailed prescriptions expressed in a statutory idiom, with separate 
provisions for entitlements, exceptions, and remedies.  Although Pound did 
not specify a mechanism for giving his plan the force of law, he seems to have 
imagined it as a kind of self-executing treaty or a statute to be implemented 
by each nation on the basis of a bilateral protocol.  Because of the form in 
which he wrote it, Pound’s sketch may appropriately be referred to as a “stat-
ute,” as I will do here.  (The relevant portion of Pound’s article is included in 
full in the Appendix hereto.) 
This Article demonstrates the historical and present-day significance of 
Pound’s proposed statute, which has never been discussed by legal scholars 
and has received but scant attention from literary scholars.16  Like William 
Wordsworth and Mark Twain, whose efforts to reform copyright law are much 
better known,17 Pound is a major writer whose views on literary property were 
shaped by a particular conception of authorship and the role of art in society.  
Part I of this Article places Pound’s statute within its immediate historical 
context.  Pound offered his statute as a contribution to the debate over 
protectionist features of U.S. copyright law that for more than a century had 
                                                                                                                            
virtually be free for any Bookaneer to avail himself of its pages and its popularity with impunity.”); 
STYLUS, AMERICAN PUBLISHERS AND ENGLISH AUTHORS 10 (Baltimore, Eugene L. Didier 1879) 
(“We have shown the fatal result of the bookaneering practice of our [American] publishers in 
poetry and fiction.”).  In the first decades of the twentieth century, the term “booklegging” was 
used to refer to literary piracy and the trade in pornography.  See JAY A. GERTZMAN, BOOKLEGGERS 
AND SMUTHOUNDS: THE TRADE IN EROTICA, 1920–1940, at 15, 87 (1999). 
 15. Pound, supra note 8, at 208. 
 16. Pound’s New Age article containing his proposed copyright statute is mentioned, but 
not discussed, in POUND AND CUTTING, supra note 13, at 240 n.10. 
 17. For Wordsworth’s copyright-reform work, see generally Susan Eilenberg, Mortal Pages: 
Wordsworth and the Reform of Copyright, 56 ENG. LITERARY HIST. 351 (1989); Russell Noyes, Wordsworth 
and the Copyright Act of 1842: Addendum, 76 PUBLICATIONS MOD. LANGUAGE ASS’N 380 (1961); 
Paul M. Zall, Wordsworth and the Copyright Act of 1842, 70 PUBLICATIONS MOD. LANGUAGE 
ASS’N 132 (1955).  See also MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 
110–12 (1993) (discussing Wordsworth’s views on copyright reform); CATHERINE SEVILLE, 
LITERARY COPYRIGHT REFORM IN EARLY VICTORIAN ENGLAND: THE FRAMING OF THE 1842 
COPYRIGHT ACT 159–75 (1999) (same).  For Mark Twain’s similar efforts, see generally SIVA 
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 35–80 (2001).  See also Catherine Seville, Authors as 
Copyright Campaigners: Mark Twain’s Legacy, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 283, 311–52 (2008) 
[hereinafter Seville, Authors as Copyright Campaigners]. 
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favored the interests of American printers and book manufacturers at the 
expense of foreign authors’ rights.  Even though Congress amended the law in 
1891 and again in 1909 to give foreign authors a better chance of obtaining 
copyright protection in the United States,18 the technical requirements were 
onerous and many authors could not comply with them.19  As a result, Pound 
and others complained that the formalities of U.S. copyright law permitted and 
even encouraged legalized piracy of foreign authors by American publishers. 
Part II sets forth the specific terms of Pound’s statute and explores the 
philosophical and historical influences that informed his proposed copyright 
scheme.  Pound’s statute begins by declaring that copyrights should be exclusive 
and perpetual.  He goes on, surprisingly, to introduce broad compulsory-license 
provisions that would prevent authors and their heirs from interfering with 
later efforts to reprint and translate works, and would only require publishers to 
pay a fixed royalty on sales.  Similar royalty schemes had been urged by British 
and American proponents of copyright reform during the previous century, but 
in 1918 compulsory licenses had been adopted in only limited forms by Britain 
and the United States.20  The tension in Pound’s proposal between a perpetual, 
exclusive copyright and expansive compulsory licenses shows him to be an 
inheritor of two legal and economic traditions.  On the one hand, Pound 
embraced a Lockean and Romantic belief in a strong property rule grounded in 
an author’s natural rights and unique personality.  On the other, he espoused an 
anti-monopoly, free-trade preference for a liability rule that would encourage 
wide dissemination of affordable works to serve the public interest.  Pound thus 
advocated what might strike many as an economic contradiction: perpetual 
copyright protection grounded in a consumer-side commitment to the unham-
pered spread of culture. 
                                                                                                                            
 18. See infra notes 50–59 and accompanying text. 
 19. Without ready access to a willing American publisher, many foreign authors could not 
comply with the formalities for obtaining copyright protection in the United States.  For example, 
the British novelist Arnold Bennett observed in 1909: “A year ago no American publisher would 
publish my work on any terms, and the copyright of The Old Wives’ Tale [Bennett’s novel] was lost 
there for this cause.”  Journal Entry of Arnold Bennett (Oct. 27, 1909), in THE JOURNAL OF 
ARNOLD BENNETT 341, 342 (Viking Press, Inc. 1933).  Because James Joyce could not satisfy the 
American copyright formalities within a few months of the publication of Ulysses in France, he 
lost the chance of securing an American copyright in his novel.  Spoo, supra note 13, at 647–48.  
Referring to the same formalities, the English modernist author and painter Wyndham Lewis 
wrote Pound in 1926: “6 months after publication in England [of his book, The Art of Being Ruled] 
it has to be setup in or arranged for in America, else I lose the american [sic] copyright. . . . I know 
nothing whatever about American publishers . . . .”  Letter From Wyndham Lewis to Ezra Pound 
(Jan. 15, 1926), in POUND/LEWIS: THE LETTERS OF EZRA POUND AND WYNDHAM LEWIS 162 
(Timothy Materer ed., 1985); see also infra notes 50–59 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 163–166 and accompanying text. 
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Part III explores the literary implications of Pound’s statute, in particular 
his attempts to promote unimpeded communication among living writers of 
all nations and encourage fair and robust competition between living and 
dead authors through his copyright scheme.  Pound crafted his compulsory-
license provisions to permit wide dissemination of books while ensuring a 
financial return to copyright owners.  At the same time, he believed that a per-
petual copyright would promote fair competition between past and present 
writers in the marketplace.  A system that permitted copyrights to expire, he 
believed, allowed publishers to reprint older works cheaply, while contempo-
rary works, still protected by copyright, were sold at supracompetitive prices.21  
The resulting price difference would always give an unfair market advantage 
to earlier authors, who already enjoyed the benefit of being familiar to readers.  
By contrast, serious contemporary authors who were not content with imitating 
the past faced the double hurdle of trying to market innovative experiments at 
prices that publishers of public-domain works could easily beat.  Pound sought to 
ensure that modern authors could compete more successfully for the attention 
of readers by eliminating the distinction between protected and public-domain 
works through a perpetual, royalty-based copyright.  His statute was thus, in signifi-
cant part, a strategy for promoting literary modernism.22 
Finally, Part IV demonstrates that in proposing special safeguards against 
the abuse of copyrights by authors’ heirs, Pound showed himself to be remarka-
bly and presciently alert to the dangers posed by lengthy copyright terms 
unaccompanied by limitations that adequately protect the public interest.  
Today, the estates of James Joyce, T.S. Eliot, Marianne Moore, Samuel Beckett, 
and other modernist authors use extended copyrights to discourage or control 
use of those authors’ works by scholars, critics, and others.23  Pound’s perpetual, 
royalty-based copyright would, in principle, have removed or reduced such 
obstacles to the study and enjoyment of modernist authors.  Moreover, Pound’s 
                                                                                                                            
 21. See infra notes 193–203 and accompanying text. 
 22. An international movement that prized innovation and experimentation, modernism 
included authors as different as Pound, Gertrude Stein, W.B. Yeats, James Joyce, T.S. Eliot, 
Virginia Woolf, and Marianne Moore, to name only some of the most prominent figures.  Flourishing 
between 1890 and 1945, literary modernism was characterized by 
(1) a revulsion against urban, industrial, bourgeois society, with its technologies of mass 
warfare; (2) a disposition to interpret modern experience in terms of patterns derived 
from archaic cultures and ancient mythologies; (3) a fascination with the unconscious 
and irrational activities of the human psyche; and (4) a rejection of post-Renaissance 
techniques of naturalistic representation in favor of spare, elemental, disjunctive, and 
ironic modes. 
Hugh Witemeyer, Introduction: Modernism Resartus, in THE FUTURE OF MODERNISM 1, 1 (Hugh 
Witemeyer ed., 1997). 
 23. See infra notes 238–266 and accompanying text. 
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statute, as unusual as it may have seemed in its own time, anticipates recent 
proposals by Richard Posner, Lawrence Lessig, and others for mitigating the 
conflict between the lengthy copyright monopoly and the needs of the public. 
I. POUND’S COPYRIGHT STATUTE AND LEGALIZED AMERICAN 
BOOK PIRACY 
Pound made it clear that one of the chief purposes of his proposed 
copyright statute was to render it “easier for an author to retain the rights to 
the work of his brain than for some scoundrel to steal them.”24  “The stupidity 
of the [American] copyright regulations,” he declared, “is most deleterious to 
America’s relations with foreign countries,” because those “regulations tend 
to keep all English and Continental authors in a state of irritation.”25  The 
particular source of this irritation was the “continuous and needless bother 
about the prevention of literary piracy.”26  Legalized American book piracy 
was a theme Pound returned to again and again over the next decade.  In 
1927, he announced that “[f]or next President I want no man who is not 
lucidly and clearly and with no trace or shadow of ambiguity against . . . the 
thieving copyright law.”27  The “infamous state of the American law,” he 
wrote his friend and fellow modernist author James Joyce, “not only tolerates 
robbery but encourages unscrupulous adventurers to rob authors living outside 
of the American borders.”28  At every opportunity, Pound heaped colorful 
invective on the U.S. copyright law: “dishonest[],”29 “rascally,”30 a “clot,”31 
and a law “originally designed to favour the printing trade at the expense of 
the mental life of the country.”32 
Pound’s anger had been shared by many who complained of “Yankee 
pirates” during the nineteenth century.33  By the 1830s, the “practice of 
                                                                                                                            
 24. Pound, supra note 8, at 208. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Pound, supra note 9, at 393. 
 28. Letter From Ezra Pound to James Joyce (Dec. 25, 1926), in POUND/JOYCE: THE LETTERS OF 
EZRA POUND TO JAMES JOYCE, WITH POUND’S ESSAYS ON JOYCE 226, 226 (Forrest Read ed., 1967). 
 29. Ezra Pound, The Exile, EXILE, Spring 1928, at 102, para. 7, reprinted in 5 POETRY AND 
PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 4, at 16, 17. 
 30. Ezra Pound and Will Irwin Denounce Copyright and Boston Censorship, CHI. TRIB. (Paris), 
Mar. 9, 1928, at 2, reprinted in 5 POETRY AND PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 4, at 27. 
 31. Ezra Pound, Newspapers, History, Etc., 3 HOUND & HORN 574, 577 (1930), reprinted in 
5 POETRY AND PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 4, at 227, 229. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., S.S. Conant, International Copyright: An American View, MACMILLAN’S 
MAG., May–Oct. 1879, at 151, 159. 
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reprinting British books and periodicals” without permission had become 
“widespread in the American book trade.”34  Although some American publish-
ers made ex gratia payments to British authors, the U.S. copyright law, which 
withheld protection from foreign writers,35 did not impose any such duty.  
Other publishers in the highly competitive book trade capitalized on this legal 
vacuum by reprinting British works without authorization or courtesy 
payments.36  In 1842, Charles Dickens denounced the “scoundrel-booksellers” 
who “grow rich [in the United States] from publishing books, the authors of 
which do not reap one farthing from their issue,” and the “vile, blackguard, and 
detestable newspaper[s]” that reprinted British writings without authorization 
or remuneration.37  Even Walt Whitman, usually a lyrical advocate of the 
interests of American multitudes, lamented his compatriots’ exploitation of 
the legal vulnerability of foreign authors: 
Do not our publishers fatten quicker and deeper?  (helping themselves, 
under shelter of a delusive and sneaking law, or rather absence of 
law, to most of their forage, poetical, pictorial, historical, romantic, 
even comic, without money and without price—and fiercely resisting 
the timidest proposal to pay for it.)38 
                                                                                                                            
 34. JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS: AN HISTORICAL STUDY OF 
COPYRIGHT IN BRITAIN 153 (1994); see also DAVID SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 
155–56 (1992) (noting that “such reprinting was not illegal, even though it might be deemed 
unethical” and discussing the practice of making ex gratia payments to British authors in exchange 
for authorization to reprint). 
 35. For example, the first U.S. copyright statute conferred protection only on “citizens of 
these United States, or residents therein,” and expressly provided that “nothing in this act shall be 
construed to extend to prohibit the importation or vending, reprinting or publishing within the 
United States, of any map, chart, book or books, written, printed, or published by any person not a 
citizen of the United States, in foreign parts or places without the jurisdiction of the United 
States.”  Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §§ 1, 5, 1 Stat. 124, 124–25 (repealed 1831).  These 
provisions remained consistent through later revisions of the copyright law.  See, e.g., Act of Feb. 
3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 8, 4 Stat. 436, 436, 438 (repealed 1870) (same). 
 36. See FEATHER, supra note 34, at 154, 157–58.  It should be noted “that some British 
publishers were equally unscrupulous in reprinting American books without permission” in the nineteenth 
century.  See id. at 154; see also Conant, supra note 33, at 160 (noting that many American titles 
were reprinted in Britain without remuneration to their authors). 
 37. Letter From Charles Dickens to Henry Austin (May 1, 1842), in 3 THE LETTERS OF 
CHARLES DICKENS, 1842–1843, at 228, 230 (Madeline House et al. eds., 1974); see also CATHERINE 
SEVILLE, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF COPYRIGHT LAW: BOOKS, BUCCANEERS AND THE BLACK 
FLAG IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 165–69 (2006) (discussing Dickens’s efforts to influence American 
opinion on the international copyright question). 
 38. WALT WHITMAN, DEMOCRATIC VISTAS (1871), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE 
POETRY AND PROSE OF WALT WHITMAN AS PREPARED BY HIM FOR THE DEATHBED EDITION 
208, 242 (Malcolm Cowley ed., 1948). 
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Another nineteenth-century American poet, James Russell Lowell, condensed 
his frustration with American book piracy into a single uncompromising 
quatrain, which he entitled “International Copyright”: 
In vain we call old notions fudge, 
And bend our conscience to our dealing; 
The Ten Commandments will not budge, 
And stealing will continue stealing.39 
Efforts to establish a reciprocal Anglo-American copyright law repeat-
edly met with obstacles during the nineteenth century.  British law granted 
copyright to foreign authors on conditions roughly similar to those imposed 
on British authors,40 but a comparable privilege did not exist for British 
authors in the United States.41  Although some American publishers observed 
what was called “courtesy of the trade”—a self-regulating system in which the 
first publisher to reprint a British work, after paying the author a sum, 
enjoyed “title” to the work that competitors in the American book market 
generally respected—no formal protections existed for foreign writers.42 
                                                                                                                            
 39. JAMES RUSSELL LOWELL, International Copyright, in THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS 
433, 433 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin 1896). 
 40. In the late nineteenth century, a foreign author could obtain copyright protection in 
Britain if (1) publication was made in the United Kingdom, (2) there was no previous publication, 
and (3) the author was within the British dominions at the time of publication.  British authors 
had to comply with the first two conditions, but not the third.  See EATON S. DRONE, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND 
THE UNITED STATES 230 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1879); see also A COMPANION TO THE 
VICTORIAN NOVEL 19 (Patrick Brantlinger & William B. Thesing eds., 2002) (“An 1854 Act of 
Parliament . . . enabl[ed] American authors to secure British copyrights for their work by simply 
being present in Britain or any of its dependencies at the time of publication.”).  As Matthew 
Arnold pointed out in 1880, American authors could obtain British copyright if they visited 
England or even Canada at the time their book was published in Britain.  See Matthew Arnold, 
Copyright, FORTNIGHTLY REV., Mar. 1880, at 319, 331, reprinted in 9 MATTHEW ARNOLD, 
ENGLISH LITERATURE AND IRISH POLITICS 114, 130 (R.H. Super ed. 1973); see also id. (“Mr. 
Henry James [the American author who lived in England] gets [copyright] in the same way at this 
moment for those charming novels of his which we are all reading.  But no English author can 
acquire copyright in the United States.”). 
 41. See supra note 35. 
 42. See FEATHER, supra note 34, at 160; SAUNDERS, supra note 34, at 156–57; see also 
WILLIAM BRIGGS, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT, WITH SPECIAL SECTIONS ON THE 
COLONIES AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 111–14, 115–16 (1906) (discussing American 
“courtesy of the trade” and “courtesy copyright”); id. at 116 (“[A]t the present day [1906] leading 
publishing firms in the large cities of America pay substantial sums to English authors for their 
American ‘rights,’ well knowing that in America these rights are moral only, not legal.”); 1 JOHN 
TEBBEL, A HISTORY OF BOOK PUBLISHING IN THE UNITED STATES 208 (1972) (describing trade 
courtesy in nineteenth-century America); see 2 id. at 54–55 (same); Arnold, supra note 40, at 133 
(discussing “trade-courtesy” and publishers that refused to observe it); Conant, supra note 33, at 
157–59 (discussing American publishers’ “‘law of courtesy’” and payments made to British authors 
for reprints); Spoo, supra note 13, at 656–59 (discussing the history of trade courtesy and the courtesy 
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In response to a petition presented by British authors, Senator Henry 
Clay introduced a bill in Congress in 1837 that would have recognized British 
copyrights in the United States.43  The bill encountered strong opposition 
from the American book trade and never became law.44  In 1854, President 
Franklin Pierce signed an Anglo-American copyright treaty providing for 
reciprocal recognition of the rights of authors and publishers in the two coun-
tries.45  Once again, stubborn resistance from publishers and booksellers caused 
the treaty to fall short of ratification by the Senate.46  Writing in 1880, British 
poet and essayist Matthew Arnold complained that the United States had 
repeatedly “refused to entertain the question of international copyright.”47  A 
series of Anglo-American copyright bills introduced in Congress between 
1886 and 1890 met with the same fate.48  One historian has observed, “The 
publishers of cheap reprint series were against [such legislation], and so too 
were the increasingly powerful trade unions in the printing industry who 
feared loss of work if the copyright in imported books were protected under 
American law.”49 
When Congress finally granted rights to foreign authors in the Chace 
International Copyright Act of 1891,50 protection came at the price of large 
concessions to American book manufacturers.51  Chief among these were the 
express conditions that a foreign work in any language could acquire copyright 
protection in the United States only if the work was printed from type set 
within this country and two copies of the American imprint were deposited 
in the Copyright Office on or before the date of first publication anywhere else.52  
Although resourceful or well-connected foreign authors might be able to 
satisfy this tricky requirement of first or simultaneous publication in the United 
States,53 many others could not.54 
                                                                                                                            
copyright that was improvised for the edition of James Joyce’s Ulysses published in the United 
States in 1934). 
 43. See FEATHER, supra note 34, at 158; SAUNDERS, supra note 34, at 158–59. 
 44. See FEATHER, supra note 34, at 158; see also SEVILLE, supra note 37, at 160–62 (discussing 
the Clay bill and opposition to it from the American publishing trade). 
 45. FEATHER, supra note 34, at 167. 
 46. See id. at 166–67; see also SAUNDERS, supra note 34, at 161 (describing the failure of 
the 1854 treaty to gain ratification). 
 47. Arnold, supra note 40, at 130. 
 48. See FEATHER, supra note 34, at 168. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106. 
 51. See SAUNDERS, supra note 34, at 165; FEATHER, supra note 34, at 168. 
 52. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, sec. 3, § 4956, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107–08.  
 53. See FEATHER, supra note 34, at 169 (describing negotiations by George Bernard Shaw’s 
publisher for publication in New York of Shaw’s The Perfect Wagnerite in 1898). 
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The 1909 U.S. Copyright Act—the law in force when Pound proposed 
his copyright statute in 1918—modified the manufacturing conditions of the 
Chace Act but did not abolish them.55  First, the 1909 Act granted automatic 
protection to foreign-language works of foreign origin by exempting them 
from the manufacturing requirements.56  Second, the 1909 Act relaxed the 
manufacturing requirements for foreign-origin works in English somewhat by 
providing a thirty-day “ad interim” copyright if a copy of the foreign edition 
was deposited in the U.S. Copyright Office within thirty days of its publica-
tion abroad.57  Once a copy was deposited, the work then had to be reprinted 
on U.S. soil within the thirty-day ad interim window.58  Failure to do so—and 
thus give American artisans their due—would result in the loss of American 
copyright after ad interim protection had expired.59 
When Pound denounced the U.S. copyright law as “originally designed 
to favour the printing trade at the expense of the mental life of the country,”60 
he had in mind the history of codified protectionism for domestic book 
manufacturers that, as one American observer put it in 1879, “has been the 
occasion of more bitter feelings between the two countries than many a war 
has engendered.”61  Although there were other, more altruistic reasons for 
withholding automatic protection from British works—such as the fear that 
                                                                                                                            
 54. For example, French, German, and Italian authors found the administrative challenges 
posed by the manufacturing requirements almost “insuperable,” inasmuch as their works had to be 
translated into English before being published in the United States.  See Geo. Haven Putnam, Preface to 
the Second Edition of THE QUESTION OF COPYRIGHT, at iii, v–vi (Geo. Haven Putman ed., New 
York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2d ed., rev. 1896) (1891); see also SEVILLE, supra note 37, at 248 
(discussing the difficulties posed by the manufacturing requirements for foreign authors). 
 55. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. 
 56. See id. § 15, 35 Stat. at 1078–79. 
 57. See id. § 21, 35 Stat. at 1080. 
 58. See id. § 22, 35 Stat. at 1080.  In recognition of the disruptions caused by the war, the 
ad interim and reprinting provisions were extended in 1919 to sixty days and four months, 
respectively.  See Act of Dec. 18, 1919, ch. 11, § 21, 41 Stat. 368, 369.  Later, the time periods 
were lengthened again to six months and five years, respectively.  See Act of June 3, 1949, ch. 
171, sec. 2, § 22, 63 Stat. 153, 154.  For a general discussion of the ad interim and manufacturing 
provisions and their impact on foreign authors, see Spoo, supra note 13, at 642–53; see also 
generally Charles Rembar, Xenophilia in Congress: Ad Interim Copyright and the Manufacturing 
Clause, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 770 (1969); Dorothy M. Schrader, Ad Interim Copyright and the 
Manufacturing Clause: Another View of the Candy Case, 16 VILL. L. REV. 215 (1970).  For a 
succinct account of the mechanics and consequences of an ad interim filing by a former Assistant 
Register of Copyrights, see HERBERT A. HOWELL, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNING REGISTRATION AND PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHT 
WORKS, INCLUDING PRINTS AND LABELS 89–92 (2d ed. 1948). 
 59. See RICHARD ROGERS BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 147 (1912) 
(explaining that failure to comply with the 1909 Act’s ad interim and manufacturing provisions “will 
forfeit the right to obtain copyright protection and throw the foreign work into the public domain”). 
 60. Pound, supra note 31, at 229. 
 61. Conant, supra note 33, at 156. 
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inexpensive American reprints of British titles, which served a large and increas-
ingly literate population,62 would be replaced by small and pricey British import 
editions63—there is no question that this protectionism rendered the United 
States an outcast from the international copyright community.  The manu-
facturing requirements, together with other copyright formalities, prevented 
the United States from joining the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works for more than one hundred years after other 
major nations had signed it.64  The Berne Convention of 1886 established an 
International Copyright Union, and made protection “automatic throughout 
all the countries acceding to it in behalf of the authors and artists of every 
country in the world, whether inside or outside of the Union, and without 
the need of complying with any formalities whatever . . . .”65  Berne protected 
the rights of authors as long as their works were first published in any of the 
member countries.66  It was not until 1989, a few years after the last vestiges of 
the manufacturing clause had been repealed, that the United States finally 
adhered to Berne.67 
                                                                                                                            
 62. The 1850 U.S. Census reported a literacy rate of approximately 90 percent among 
white men and women.  See CANDY GUNTHER BROWN, THE WORD IN THE WORLD: EVANGELICAL 
WRITING, PUBLISHING, AND READING IN AMERICA, 1789–1880, at 10 (2004); SEVILLE, supra 
note 37, at 147 (same). 
 63. See SAUNDERS, supra note 34, at 156. 
 64. See FEATHER, supra note 34, at 165, 168; SAUNDERS, supra note 34, at 166. 
 65. HOWELL, supra note 58, at 6.  The Berne Convention was originally signed by ten nations in 
1886, a number that grew substantially in the decades that followed.  Id. at 6–7, 266–67. 
 66. Beginning with the first text of the Berne Convention, the principle of national treatment 
was predicated on publication of a work in any member country.  See Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 2(1), reprinted in ARPAD BOGSCH, 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS, FROM 1886 TO 1986, at 228, 228 (1986) [hereinafter BERNE 
CONVENTION FROM 1886 TO 1896] (“Authors belonging to any country of the Union . . . shall 
enjoy in the other countries for their works, whether published in one of those countries or 
unpublished, the rights which the respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to natives.”); see 
also Putnam, supra note 54, at xvii–xviii (noting that the Berne Convention eliminated formalities 
as a condition of copyright protection for aliens). 
 67. On March 1, 1989, Congress enacted the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 
1988.  Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853.  The version of the manufacturing clause that had 
survived into the 1976 Copyright Act expired on July 1, 1986.  See Pub. L. No. 97-215, 96 Stat. 
178, 178–79 (1982) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2006)); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 
COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 152 (rev. ed., Stanford 
Univ. Press 2003) (1994) (noting the phasing out of the manufacturing clause and U.S. adherence 
to Berne in 1989). 
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II. POUND’S COPYRIGHT STATUTE: TEXT  
AND HISTORICAL INFLUENCES 
A. The Text 
In his 1918 New Age article, after explaining the urgent need for an 
Anglo-American copyright law to “cure”68 American book piracy and the ill 
will it has fostered, Pound settles down to the details of his proposed statute.  
He begins by declaring that “[t]he copyright of any book printed anywhere 
should be and remain automatically the author’s,” and that “[c]opyright from 
present date should be perpetual.”69  Under Pound’s statute, copyright in a 
work published anywhere in the world would vest automatically and exclu-
sively in the author and would last forever.70  His statute’s indifference to 
the country of publication would have tacitly repealed the manufacturing 
requirements of the 1909 Copyright Act and would have brought U.S. law 
closer to the principles of the Berne Convention. 
Two things are immediately striking about this first provision of Pound’s 
statute.  First, as might be expected of a poet and freelance journalist, Pound 
thinks of authorship in traditional, individualistic terms, apart from any rights 
that an employer might acquire through work-made-for-hire principles.71  
He therefore makes no provision for employer- or corporate-owned copyrights 
and does not address basic issues of joint authorship and copyright transfer.72  
                                                                                                                            
 68. Pound, supra note 8, at 208. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Other American authors have urged that copyrights be made perpetual.  For example, 
Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain) made a similar argument in an unpublished manuscript, The 
Great Republic’s Peanut Stand, composed in 1898, and again before a select committee of the 
British House of Lords in 1900.  See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 17, at 69–78 (summarizing and 
quoting from The Great Republic’s Peanut Stand); see also id. at 78–79 (describing Clemens’s 
appearance before the House of Lords); Seville, Authors as Copyright Campaigners, supra note 17, at 
322, 338–42, 345–46, 351 (discussing Clemens’s advocacy of perpetual copyright).  The American 
lexicographer and author, Noah Webster, also believed that copyrights should be perpetual.  Id. at 289. 
 71. The 1911 British Copyright Act provided that, absent an agreement to the contrary, 
the copyright in a work created by an employee within the course of regular employment initially 
vested in the employer, but that the author of a newspaper or magazine article retained the right 
to prevent unauthorized reproduction of the article apart from its periodical appearance.  See 
Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 5(1)(b) (Eng.).  The 1909 U.S. Copyright Act 
provided for renewal of copyright by the “proprietor” of a work made for hire, or by an author or 
his or her heirs in the case of a separately registered periodical contribution.  See Act of Mar. 4, 
1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080; see also id. § 62, 35 Stat. at 1088 (“[T]he word ‘author’ 
shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire.”). 
 72. Compare Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 5(2) (Eng.) (transfer of 
ownership); id. § 16 (joint authorship), with Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 41–46, 35 Stat. 
1075, 1084–85 (transfer of ownership). 
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Nor does he concern himself with copyrightable subject matter beyond tradi-
tional “books” and “works” by authors, even though by 1918 copyright law 
had come to embrace many other creative media.73  For example, the 1909 
U.S. Copyright Act, as originally enacted, included within its scope dramatic 
and dramatico-musical compositions, musical compositions, works of 
art, photographs, prints, and periodical illustrations.   
Second, and more startlingly, Pound blithely proposes a “perpetual”74 
copyright, despite the fact that such an enactment would be unconstitutional 
in the United States, where the supreme law of the land empowers Congress 
to grant copyrights only for “limited Times.”75  Pound was not the first or the 
last prominent American to argue that authors’ rights should last for eternity,76 
but his unconstitutional prescription is especially curious in light of his originalist 
insistence on the plain meaning of the Constitution later in his career.77 
In exchange for exclusive, perpetual rights, Pound’s statute requires the 
author to “place on file copies of his book at the National Library, Washington, 
and in the municipal libraries of the four largest American cities.”78  This 
requirement reflects Pound’s commitment to the preservation and accessibility of 
cultural products.  The 1909 U.S. Copyright Act already required that domestic 
authors deposit two copies of the “best edition” of a copyrighted work in the 
Copyright Office,79 and that foreign authors deposit one copy of the foreign 
edition in order to obtain an ad interim copyright.80  Pound expands the 
requirement to include libraries in the four largest American cities—at the time, 
                                                                                                                            
 73. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 5–6, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076–77.  Motion pictures and 
motion-picture photoplays were soon added.  See Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, § 5, 37 Stat. 488, 488. 
 74. Pound, supra note 8, at 208. 
 75. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199–204 
(2003) (discussing the “limited Times” requirement and the history of congressional enactments 
under it). 
 76. See supra text accompanying note 70.  Lending her support to the Sonny Bono 
Copyright Term Extension Act, Congresswoman Mary Bono stated, “Sonny wanted the term of copyright 
protection to last forever.  I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the 
Constitution. . . . [T]here is also [President of the Motion Picture Association of America] Jack Valenti’s 
proposal for a term to last forever less 1 day.  Perhaps the Committee may look at that next 
Congress.”  144 CONG. REC. 24,336 (1998) (statement of Rep. Bono). 
 77. Pound believed that the clause empowering Congress “[t]o coin Money [and] regulate 
the Value thereof,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5, by its clear terms gave the power to regulate the 
value of money exclusively to the federal government, effectively prohibiting banks and other 
private interests from fixing usurious lending rates or otherwise “arrogat[ing] to themselves 
unwarranted responsibilities.”  EZRA POUND, A Visiting Card (1942), reprinted in SELECTED PROSE: 
1909–1965, at 306, 326–27 (William Cookson ed., New Directions 1973) (1952) [hereinafter 
SELECTED PROSE]. 
 78. Pound, supra note 8, at 208. 
 79. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078. 
 80. Id. § 21, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080. 
1790 56 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1775 (2009) 
 
 
New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and either St. Louis or Detroit81—apparently 
in emulation of the 1911 British Copyright Act’s provision for deposit of 
copies in the British Museum and, upon demand, libraries in Oxford, Cambridge, 
Edinburgh, Dublin, and Wales.82 
The deposit requirement is the only copyright formality that Pound retains 
in his statute.  All the other formalities that the 1909 U.S. Copyright Act 
included as mandatory—domestic manufacture, affixation of copyright notice, 
renewal of the copyright after the first 28-year term83—are silently repealed 
by his proposal.84  The 1909 Act made satisfaction of these formalities a condi-
tion of copyright protection; failure to comply meant that the work was 
automatically injected into the public domain.85  As long as American law 
made copyright protection for foreign authors turn upon such technicalities, 
the United States could not hope to join the Berne Convention.86  Pound’s 
statute is pointedly pro-Berne in this respect. 
No sooner has Pound settled upon his perpetual copyright, however, than 
he dramatically qualifies it: “BUT the heirs of an author should be powerless 
to prevent the publication of his works or to extract any excessive royalties.”87  
“If the heirs neglect to keep a man’s work in print and at a price not greater 
                                                                                                                            
 81. The four largest American cities in 1916, according to population size, were New York, 
Chicago, Philadelphia, and St. Louis, in descending order.  RALPH S. TARR & FRANK M. 
MCMURRY, WORLD GEOGRAPHIES: SECOND BOOK 413 (rev. ed. 1919).  By 1920, Detroit had 
replaced St. Louis as the fourth largest city.  See FRANK M. MCMURRY & A.E. PARKINS, ADVANCED 
GEOGRAPHY app. at 481 (1921). 
 82. See Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 15 (Eng.).  Pound was not alone in 
urging that the number of copyright depositories in the United States be increased.  See, e.g., 
Samuel H. Ranck, Need of Additional Copyright Depositories, in PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
SEVENTEENTH GENERAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION HELD AT DENVER 
AND COLORADO SPRINGS, AUGUST 13–16 AND 21, 1895, at 43, 45 (n.p., Am. Libr. Ass’n 1895) 
(arguing that additional copyright depositories should be established in Denver, Chicago, New 
Orleans, and San Francisco, as well as smaller depositories in each state). 
 83. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 9, 18–20, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077, 1079–80 (affixation 
of notice); id. §§ 15, 21–22, 35 Stat. at 1078–80 (domestic manufacture and ad interim copyright); id. 
§§ 23–24, 35 Stat. at 1080–81 (renewal of copyright). 
 84. This assumes that Pound’s statute was intended to repeal these American copyright 
formalities rather than merely supplement them.  That seems a fair assumption given the breadth 
of Pound’s statute and his reiterated opposition to technical hindrances to copyright protection. 
 85. See KENNETH D. CREWS, COPYRIGHT LAW FOR LIBRARIANS AND EDUCATORS: 
CREATIVE STRATEGIES AND PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS 17–18 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the 
consequences under the 1909 Act of failure to affix copyright notice and to renew copyright). 
 86. While the Berne Convention originally made authors’ rights subject to any formalities 
prescribed by the country of origin of a work, see Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art. 2(2), supra note 66, at 228, the 1908 Berlin amendments provided 
that “[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of such rights shall not be subject to any formality . . . .”  Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Berlin Act, Nov. 13, 1908, art. 4(2), 
reprinted in BERNE CONVENTION FROM 1886 TO 1986, supra note 66, at 229, 229. 
 87. Pound, supra note 8, at 208, 209. 
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than the price of his books during his life,” Pound goes on, “then unauthor-
ised publishers should be at liberty to reprint said works, paying to heirs a 
royalty not more than 20 per cent. and not less than 10 per cent.”88  This 
provision strips heirs of the power to prevent the printing and reprinting of 
authors’ works or to raise book prices above those that existed during authors’ 
lifetimes, and substitutes a royalty entitlement to be fixed by statute, regula-
tion, or judicial decision. 
Pound’s vision of copyright recalls Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas 
Melamed’s discussion of property rules and liability rules in their classic arti-
cle, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral.89  Once the state has chosen to grant an entitlement, it must decide 
what sort of protection to throw around that entitlement.  “An entitlement is 
protected by a property rule,” Calabresi and Melamed explain, “to the extent 
that someone who wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy 
it from him in a voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is 
agreed upon by the seller.”90  By contrast, a liability rule strips the entitlement 
holder of bargaining autonomy and renders the transaction a compulsory one, 
limiting the holder to monetary compensation.  “Whenever someone may 
destroy the initial entitlement if he is willing to pay an objectively determined 
value for it, an entitlement is protected by a liability rule.”91  When an 
entitlement is protected by a property rule, the holder typically may obtain 
injunctive relief to protect the entitlement, because the holder legally may 
refuse to permit others to have access to the entitlement.  A liability rule, 
however, deprives the holder of this ability to deny access and typically 
substitutes non-injunctive, monetary remedies.92  Subsequent scholarship has 
extended Calabresi and Melamed’s taxonomy of rules to the problems of 
protecting intellectual property.93 
Pound’s statute protects author’s rights by a property rule granting them 
perpetual copyright, but a compulsory license provision is, in effect, a liability 
rule that requires authors and their heirs “to give a license to use the property 
                                                                                                                            
 88. Id. 
 89. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: 
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 90. Id. at 1092. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See id. at 1115–27 (discussing injunctive and non-injunctive remedies in the context of 
nuisance-pollution problems). 
 93. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in 
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1819 (2007) (“In intellectual property as in property, moving 
from property rules to liability rules is but one method of softening the basic presumptive 
exclusion regime, but the information-cost advantage of basic exclusion points toward greater 
strength of the presumption in favor of exclusion and property rules than is often argued.”). 
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to anyone who meets governmentally-set criteria . . . at governmentally-set 
rates of compensation.”94  Perpetual copyright would allow authors to control 
access to their works and seek injunctive relief against unauthorized users.  
But Pound’s compulsory license, once triggered, would render authors or their 
heirs powerless to deny access to the author’s work; their bargaining auton-
omy terminates in favor of a forced transaction that pays them a fixed royalty 
on copies sold. 
Pound’s compulsory license, however, is activated not so much by aspiring 
publishers who meet certain statutory criteria as by the inaction or greed of 
heirs who fail to keep authors’ works in print at affordable prices.  His statute 
effectively makes heirs the stewards of their ancestors’ works and gives them 
an opportunity to profit by their own diligence in keeping those works in 
print at low cost to the reading public.  If heirs do not act as faithful stewards, 
their exclusive property right vanishes and they may no longer seek 
injunctive relief against unauthorized uses.95  Their only protection is then 
found in a liability rule that gives them a right to recover any royalties withheld 
by the state-licensed publisher. 
Pound’s daring blend of property and liability rules does not end there.  
Declaring that “the protection of an author should not enable him to play 
dog in the manger”96 (that is, to prevent others from making use of something 
that he is not using himself), Pound adds a second, even more aggressive 
compulsory license: 
IF, having failed to have his works printed in America, or imported 
into America, or translated into American, an American publisher or 
translator apply to said author for permission to publish or translate a 
given work or works, and receive no answer within reasonable time, 
say six months, and if said author do not give notice of intending other 
American publication (quite definitely stating where and when) within 
                                                                                                                            
 94. Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the 
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1574 n.204 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon, A 
Property Right]; see also Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1623–24 & n.131 (1982) 
(discussing compulsory licenses created by copyright legislation). 
 95. See Pound, supra note 8, at 208, 209 (making a right “at law” to unpaid royalties the sole 
remedy for copyright owners who have not acted as good stewards, and therefore necessarily excluding 
injunctive relief).  Pound appears to require that heirs actually keep authors’ works in print, so that 
merely maintaining a license agreement with a publisher presumably would not be sufficient to preserve 
the exclusive property right.  If an author fell out of favor with the public, and the heirs could not find a 
publisher for some period of time, Pound’s scheme would seem to permit another publisher to take 
advantage of the compulsory license, without seeking permission from the heirs, if publishing the work 
had become economically feasible again.  Any harm to the heirs would be mitigated by payment of 
royalties on copies sold, and the public would benefit by having access to the work. 
 96. Pound, supra note 8, at 209. 
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reasonable time or designate some other translator, then, the first pub-
lisher shall have the right to publish or translate any work, paying to 
the original author a royalty of not more than 20 per cent. and not less 
than 10 per cent. in the case of a foreign work translated.  The original 
author shall have right at law to the minimum of these royalties.97 
This complicated limitation on the author’s perpetual monopoly is even 
more startling than the first one.  According to this rule, a foreign author 
retains the exclusive right to control reproduction, distribution, and transla-
tion of a work in the United States unless the author fails to have it printed 
in or imported into the country, or does not grant translation rights for an 
American edition.  If the author slumbers on these rights or refuses to exercise 
them—and Pound does not indicate how long authorial inaction must continue 
before the exception is triggered—an American publisher or translator may 
step forward and apply to the author for permission to make use of the work.  
If the author does not reply within a reasonable time and gives no notice of 
specific plans for authorized American uses, the publisher or translator may 
proceed with the proposed use, with the sole duty—enforceable at law—of 
paying a minimum royalty of 10 percent.98  Once again, Pound has fashioned 
a penalty for the copyright owner’s failure to make works available to the 
public: The author loses the protection of a strong property rule, at least 
within the United States,99 and must be content with a liability rule in the 
form of a fixed royalty.  Thus, Pound’s statute allows an author to maintain 
                                                                                                                            
 97. Id.  The expression “dog in the manger” refers to Aesop’s fable of the dog that lay down 
in an ox’s eating trough and refused to allow the ox to eat the hay that had been provided there.  
See THE FABLES OF AESOP 63–64 (Samuel Croxall trans., Geo. Fyler Townsend ed., London, 
Frederick Warne & Co. 1866).  Pound’s reference to authors who play dog in the manger likely 
refers to authors who refuse to reprint works or permit translations for almost any reason, not just 
authors who do so to be difficult or spiteful.  Pound’s point in alluding to Aesop’s fable is to underscore 
the basic perversity of not allowing a public good to achieve its highest and best use when the 
author is not making active use of the public good herself.  Pound is even clearer about this in his 
compulsory-license provision for under-performing heirs: “BUT the heirs of an author should be 
powerless to prevent the publication of his works or to extract any excessive royalties.”  Pound, 
supra note 8, at 209 (emphasis omitted).  In Pound’s scheme, heirs lose their exclusive property 
right simply by trying to prevent publication, apparently for any reason.  Pound’s intolerance of 
obstructive heirs has special significance in light of attempts in recent years by heirs of modernist 
authors to discourage or control use of those authors’ copyrighted works by scholars, critics, and 
others.  See infra notes 238–266 and accompanying text. 
 98. Though Pound does not make the point explicit, presumably the same rule applies to 
heirs who do not authorize an affordable translation of a foreign author’s work for the American 
market.  Moreover, if the author licensed a translation during her lifetime, it follows that her heirs 
would have the responsibility of keeping the translation in print at affordable prices. 
 99. Pound’s focus here is on the availability of foreign authors’ works in the United States, but 
nothing he says suggests that he did not intend the same rules to be applied to the comparable failure of 
American authors and heirs to keep works in circulation abroad, as well as in the United States. 
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exclusive rights in the United States only if he or she performs certain 
mandatory duties following the request of a publisher or translator.  If the 
author does not do so, publishing rights may be involuntarily shared with 
others who, in effect, assume control of disseminating the author’s work 
within the United States. 
Pound then adds an exception to the exception: “But no unauthorised 
translation should inhibit the later publication of an authorised translation.  
Nevertheless, an authorised translation appearing later should not in any way 
interfere with preceding translations save by fair and open competition in the 
market.”100  Thus, once a translation has entered the marketplace pursuant to 
the compulsory-license provision, the author (or the author’s heirs) may grant 
permission for a new translation to compete with the unauthorized one, and 
the only limitations on competition between the negotiated-license edition 
and the compulsory-license edition would be those arising from supply and 
demand, the quality of the translations, the tastes of the public, and other 
nonlegal factors.101 
Finally, Pound includes a special exception for extremely successful works: 
“After a man’s works have sold a certain number of copies, let us say 100,000, 
there should be no means of indefinitely preventing a very cheap reissue of his 
work.  Let us say a shilling a volume.  Royalty on same payable at rate of 20 
per cent. to author or heirs.”102  According to this rule, even if an author com-
plied fully with Pound’s statute by supplying the American market with 
copies of a work and authorizing a translation, and even if the author’s heirs 
were diligent in keeping the work in print at a fair price, once the work had 
sold 100,000 copies, any publisher would be free to bring out a shilling 
edition, with royalty payments fixed at 20 percent.103  As a British shilling was 
worth approximately twenty-five American cents (in unadjusted 1918 dollars) 
                                                                                                                            
 100. Pound, supra note 8, at 209. 
 101. See id.  Pound makes it clear that an author loses the exclusive right to control translations if 
she does not respond in a reasonable time to a request for such use.  His statute also provides that 
the author is free to license a subsequent translation that may then compete with the compulsory-license 
translation in the marketplace.  But Pound does not indicate whether, once the author has licensed the 
competing translation, new unauthorized translations may be published without the author’s permission, 
pursuant to a kind of tacking to the initial compulsory license.  Although we cannot be sure, Pound 
probably would have struck the balance, on these facts, in favor of authorial control, and required 
later translations to be blessed by a license.  For discussion of a similar compulsory-license provision for 
translations in the Berne Convention of 1896, see infra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 102. Pound, supra note 8, at 209. 
 103. Samuel Clemens in his unpublished manuscript, The Great Republic’s Peanut Stand, 
also proposed a perpetual-copyright regime with a special provision for inexpensive books.  After 
twenty years of copyright protection, a work’s publisher would be required to issue a cheap edition 
and keep it in print forever.  See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 17, at 76. 
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at the time Pound was writing,104 a compulsory-license edition would have been 
regarded as inexpensive.  (In a related article written in 1918, Pound complained 
of having to pay three dollars for a reprint of an old book.105) 
Pound’s compulsory license for cheap editions of successful works is an 
especially radical innovation, representing a significant impairment of the 
author’s copyright.  Instead of allowing a best-selling author to control the mar-
ket for cheap editions and to choose, if she wishes, to continue to extract 
profits from exclusive, pricey editions, Pound treats the author’s copyright as 
if its incentivizing purpose has run its course, and supply-side rewards must 
now yield to demand-side realities.  The ex ante incentives of the property 
right, having served to induce creation and generate profits, are retired in 
favor of the public’s need for inexpensive reprints.  Pound has thus found a 
way to mitigate the unconstitutionality of his perpetual copyright.  Rather 
than imposing an external time limitation on copyrights, he renders them 
self-limiting—in a sense, self-consuming—by making a work’s popularity 
serve as a proxy for the essentially legislative task of determining the appro-
priate duration of the property right.  When sales of a work reach 100,000, 
the copyright with respect to inexpensive editions may no longer be enforced 
by a strong property rule and the author must content herself with set royalties 
on cheap editions.  Pound’s notion of self-consuming copyrights is fully 
consistent with his wariness about what he called the “superstitious sacro-
sanctity of ‘property’”106 and his decades-long crusade for “cheap books.”107  
His call for a compulsory license for inexpensive editions suggests the depth 
of his commitment to free trade in cultural works. 
In sum, Pound’s unusual statute begins by granting a perpetual monopoly 
to authors, and ends by carving out extremely broad compulsory licenses that 
would permit any qualifying publisher to issue reprints or translations of 
works that authors or their heirs had failed or refused to keep in circulation.  
The statute thus eclectically combines property and liability rules to create an 
international system for keeping books and translations in print upon pain of 
                                                                                                                            
 104. In 1918, the British pound sterling was worth $4.8665 in U.S. dollars.  There were twenty 
shillings in a pound.  See 8 THE WORLD BOOK: ORGANIZED KNOWLEDGE IN STORY AND PICTURE 
4802 (M.V. O’Shea et al. eds., 1920); see also TWO THOUSAND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT 
THE WAR 197 (Review of Reviews Co. ed., 1918) (“[A British pound] is worth $4.8665. . . . For 
convenience in figuring, the value of a sovereign or pound sterling is usually taken as $5 when 
only round numbers are required.”). 
 105. See Ezra Pound, Tariff and Copyright, NEW AGE, Sept. 26, 1918, at 348, 349, reprinted in 
3 POETRY AND PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 4, at 190, 191. 
 106. EZRA POUND, ABC of Economics (1933), in SELECTED PROSE, supra note 77, at 233, 256. 
 107. Letter From Ezra Pound to Dorothy Pound (Oct. 14, 1945), in LETTERS IN CAPTIVITY, 
supra note 7, at 131. 
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loss or impairment of the exclusive property right.  As long as the foreign 
author does not delay in authorizing American publications and translations, 
he or she retains a strong property right to engage in supracompetitive 
monopoly pricing and to sue for injunctive and monetary relief in the event 
of infringement.  Likewise, heirs may maintain the author’s original monopoly 
pricing and sue for injunctive and monetary relief, but only if they keep the 
work in print and do not raise the price.  If any of these conditions is not met, 
the property rule favoring authors and heirs turns into a liability rule favoring 
the public; the perpetual copyright becomes a mere right to damages in the 
form of a fixed royalty.  Finally, even if all statutory conditions are satisfied, 
authors and heirs will not be able to insist upon monopoly pricing once a 
work sells 100,000 copies.  At that point, Pound’s self-limiting copyright makes 
a compulsory license for cheap reprints available to any publisher, regardless 
of the wishes of the copyright owner. 
Pound’s conditioning of exclusive rights upon compliance with statutory 
directives strangely recalls the 1891 and 1909 U.S. Copyright Acts, under 
which foreign authors could obtain American copyright only by complying 
with the manufacturing requirements and other formalities108—requirements 
that Pound vehemently opposed.  The difference, of course, is that the pri-
mary intended beneficiaries of the protectionist manufacturing requirements 
were American printers and bookbinders, whereas under Pound’s statute it is 
the reading public that is meant to benefit from statutory compliance by 
authors and heirs.  Moreover, by quietly repealing the manufacturing clause 
and granting perpetual and exclusive copyright protection, his statute sought 
to restore legal symmetry and reciprocity to the transatlantic publishing 
scene, effectively elevating all foreign-origin works from second-class citizenship 
to copyright equality with works originating on U.S. soil. 
What is perhaps most intriguing about Pound’s scheme is that it sets up 
elaborate machinery to arrive at essentially the same result that American 
publishers of the nineteenth century had brought about through “courtesy of the 
trade”109: a wide dissemination of inexpensive books, with a fair payment to 
authors.  What, then, is the difference between Pound’s statute and trade cour-
tesy?  The chief difference is that in the latter system, once an American 
publisher had been the first to reprint and pay for a British work, other com-
petitors in the book trade voluntarily respected the publisher’s “courtesy 
copyright” or “title” in the work.  Under Pound’s statute, once the compulsory-
license provision is triggered by the neglect or obstinacy of authors or their 
                                                                                                                            
 108. See supra notes 50–59 and accompanying text. 
 109. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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heirs, any and all qualifying publishers may issue the work, non-exclusively 
and simultaneously (unless publishers begin to observe something like trade 
courtesy again).110  Of course, under Pound’s proposal, foreign authors and 
their heirs initially have much more control over publication of works than 
they did when American copyright law afforded foreign-origin works little or no 
protection.  But that control is precarious; it is lost or greatly impaired if authors 
or heirs fail to meet Pound’s criteria.  Pound’s scheme is radically free-trade in 
its orientation and deeply committed to unfettered dissemination of works as a 
way of promoting international understanding. 
It is not hard to see that what Pound initially characterizes as perpetual 
protection for authors’ intellectual labor is essentially a scheme for maximizing 
the availability of works and translations.  In the end, Pound seems more 
interested in supplying the market with affordable books than with increasing 
protections for authors.  His is a rare kind of copyright proposal: a consumer-side 
scheme couched in a plea for creators’ rights. 
But if dissemination of works and robust competition among publishers 
and translators were Pound’s primary goals, why did he grant a perpetual 
copyright in the first place?  Why didn’t he propose to abolish copyright 
altogether and rely on the public domain to achieve these ends?  There are 
two parts to the answer.  First, Pound believed that authors’ intellectual labor 
entitled them to royalties and to a property right that they could pass on to 
their progeny.111  Second, he distrusted the public domain because he believed 
that it gave earlier, public-domain authors an unfair competitive advantage 
over contemporary, copyrighted authors in the economic and intellectual 
marketplace.112  Both of these points are discussed below. 
B. Historical and Philosophical Influences 
In 1899, the English politician and law professor Augustine Birrell 
wrote, “Perpetual copyright is dead.  Nobody cares about it any longer.”113  
Recent scholarship has echoed his assessment: “[P]erpetual copyright was a dead 
issue by the end of the nineteenth century.  So . . . was the notion of an 
                                                                                                                            
 110. Though Pound does not make the point explicit, if an author failed to reply to the requests 
of multiple publishers, Pound’s statute on its face would permit each of those publishers to issue the work 
and require each to remit royalties.  The proposal does not attempt to regulate the conduct of multiple 
publishers in simultaneously marketing the same title, presumably because Pound favored unfettered free 
trade once authors or heirs had lost the exclusivity of their property right. 
 111. See infra notes 117–141 and accompanying text. 
 112. See infra notes 193–204 and accompanying text. 
 113. AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 
IN BOOKS 206 (London, Cassell & Co. 1899). 
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alternative to fixed-term monopoly copyright [in a broad-based royalty or 
compulsory-license scheme].”114  But in his 1918 New Age article, Ezra Pound 
sought to resurrect both lost causes—everlasting copyright and comprehen-
sive compulsory licensing—and, even more ambitiously, to fit them together in 
a workable scheme. 
As idiosyncratic and eclectic as such an effort may seem—and it is both—
Pound’s statute is nevertheless a product of identifiable legal traditions and 
copyright discourses that he inherited from the nineteenth century and his own 
time.  One of those traditions—the practice of “trade courtesy” among American 
publishers—is discussed above.115  Others include the Lockean theory of labor 
as the source of natural rights in property, the Romantic ideology of unique 
personality, and, most importantly, nineteenth-century efforts to reform British 
and American copyright law by introducing a royalty system to replace the 
copyright monopoly.116  The latter movement, with its daring proposals for 
compulsory licenses and liability rules, was the most powerful influence on 
Pound’s idea of legislating a perpetual monopoly that could quickly turn into 
a bare entitlement to royalties if the conduct of authors or heirs threatened to 
deprive the public of a plentiful supply of inexpensive literature.  These influ-
ences are discussed in the following two subsections. 
1. Genius, Intellectual Labor, and Oil Stock 
In his New Age article, Pound justifies his proposal for a perpetual 
copyright by invoking two related traditions of copyright discourse.  First, he 
observes, “It ought to be easier for an author to retain the rights to the work 
of his brain than for some scoundrel to steal them.”117  In another version of 
the same article, Pound makes the allusion to authorial labor even more 
emphatic: “It should be easier for a man to keep or keep the right to the work 
of his hands, or of his brain, than for another to steal it.”118  Second, he likens 
copyrights to more familiar forms of property.  “In my own case,” he writes, “I 
wish to leave my royalties as a literary endowment.  I should be able to do this 
with as much security as if I had acquired oil stock, or government bonds, 
instead of producing literature.”119  These two remarks—one appealing to a 
                                                                                                                            
 114. PAUL K. SAINT-AMOUR, THE COPYWRIGHTS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
LITERARY IMAGINATION 81 (2003). 
 115. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
 116. See infra notes 145–162 and accompanying text. 
 117. Pound, supra note 8, at 208. 
 118. Ezra Pound, Tariff and Copyright, LITTLE REV., Nov. 1918, at 21, 24, reprinted in 3 
POETRY AND PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 4, at 226, 228. 
 119. Pound, supra note 8, at 208. 
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notion of natural rights grounded in authorial labor, the other to the no-
nonsense intuition that property is property—derive from related areas of 
copyright discourse, or property talk,120 and help us to understand Pound’s 
willingness to legislate a perpetual right for the products of authorship. 
The idea that intellectual property has its genesis in the mental exer-
tions of authors is often traced to John Locke’s labor theory of the origins of 
property.121  Locke conceived of property as something appropriated from the 
spontaneous common state of nature by one who, having “a Property in his own 
Person” and in the “Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands,” “mixe[s] 
his Labour with [what he has removed from the state of nature], and joyn[s] to 
it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property.”122  Having 
removed a portion of the commons and “annexed” his labor to it, the laborer is 
entitled to “exclude[ ] the common right of other Men.”123  Property is therefore 
a natural right that results from a merger of private labor and public domain 
in something that can be demarcated and owned.  Locke viewed this “origi-
nal Law of Nature, for the beginning of Property” as antecedent to the 
“positive Laws” that are enacted “to determine Property.”124 
Although Locke was not writing of intellectual property, in later years 
scholars, courts, and polemicists came to apply his labor theory to copyrights, 
patents, and other intangibles.125  In 1776, the British Protestant minister 
William Enfield wrote, “Labour gives a man a natural right of property in that 
which he produces: literary compositions are the effect of labour; authors 
have therefore a natural right of property in their works.”126  Throughout the 
                                                                                                                            
 120. I allude to Carol M. Rose’s characterization of the various approaches to explaining the 
institution of property as “scholarly property-talk.”  See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, 
or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 602 (1998). 
 121. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285–302 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1988) (1690). 
 122. Id. at 287–88. 
 123. Id. at 288. 
 124. Id. at 289 (emphasis omitted). 
 125. See generally BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760–1911, at 23–24 (1999) (discussing the use of Lockean 
labor theory by courts and pamphleteers to legitimize the concept of literary property). 
 126. WILLIAM ENFIELD, OBSERVATIONS ON LITERARY PROPERTY (1774), reprinted in THE 
LITERARY PROPERTY DEBATE: EIGHT TRACTS, 1774–1775, at 21 (Stephen Parks ed., Garland 
Publ’g, Inc., 1974).  Even in recent times, scholars have found Locke’s labor theory a fertile source 
for debates over the nature and purpose of intellectual property.  See, e.g., Gordon, A Property 
Right, supra note 94, at 1540–83 (setting forth a Lockean theory of natural rights as applied to the 
public’s right to use intellectual property, and citing numerous scholarly invocations of Locke in the 
intellectual-property context).  Courts over the centuries have also resorted to the Lockean labor 
concept to uphold intellectual property.  See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 
1002–04 (1984) (citing Locke in holding that trade secrets can be “property” under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Taking Clause) (citing JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. 
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nineteenth century, proponents of strong copyright protection employed a 
loose Lockean rhetoric in asserting that authors had special “abstract 
rights . . . in what is called ‘brain production.’”127  Often, these proponents 
suggested that authorial labor justified the belief that “literary property exists 
by the common law,”128 even though it had long been settled in the courts, at 
least with respect to published works, that copyright was a limited creature of 
statute rather than a perpetual common law entitlement.129  This did not stop 
polemicists from contending that copyright “should be perpetual, like other 
kinds of property,” and from arguing that it was “a strange perversion of jus-
tice to limit an author’s right in the creations of his mind, and a time may 
come when this anomaly shall cease to be a stain on our statute-books.”130 
The nineteenth-century British philosopher Herbert Spencer, an ardent 
champion of authors’ rights, elaborately invoked the Lockean theory to make 
his point: 
[The author] has simply combined with certain components of [the 
common stock] something exclusively his own—his thoughts, his 
conclusions, his sentiments, his technical skill: things which more 
truly belong to him than do any visible and tangible things to their 
owners; since all of these contain raw material which has been 
removed from the potential use of others.  So that in fact a production 
of mental labour may be regarded as property in a fuller sense than may 
a product of bodily labour; since that which constitutes its value is 
                                                                                                                            
Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing 1980) (1690)); Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201, 252 
(K.B.) (holding that copyrights are valid because “an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his 
own ingenuity and labor”), overruled by Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.).  The 
Lockean labor theory overlaps with the concept of “laborious authorship,” whereby copyright was 
found to exist in factual works, such as calendars, maps, catalogues, and other informational works, by 
virtue of the labor and expense that were invested in assembling them.  See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and 
Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1875–81 
(1990) (discussing the development of the “laborious authorship” basis for copyright in scholarly 
commentary and judicial opinions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).  In Feist Publications, 
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), the Supreme Court rejected “sweat of the 
brow” or “industrious collection” as in itself a basis for copyright protection in the United States, 
holding that copyright law did not prevent alphabetical listings in the white pages of a phone book 
from being appropriated by a competitor.  Id. at 352–53, 363–64. 
 127. Conant, supra note 33, at 151. 
 128. Id. 
 129. In Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.), the British House of Lords 
overturned a King’s Bench decision (Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.)) that had held 
that a perpetual common law right survived the limited term of copyright for published works imposed 
by the Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).  A comparable decision in the United States was 
rendered in Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834), in which the Supreme Court held that 
published works were subject to the limited copyright term provided by the U.S. copyright statute, and 
were not protected by a perpetual common law right.  Id. at 660–61. 
 130. Conant, supra note 33, at 151. 
Ezra Pound’s Copyright Statute 1801 
 
 
exclusively created by the worker.  And if so, there seems no reason 
why the duration of the possession in this case should not be at least as 
great as the duration of possession in other cases.131 
Spencer’s chain of reasoning traces a familiar argumentative crescendo: 
An author’s labor is more intimately bound up with his or her unique emo-
tion and intellect than is manual labor.  It follows that an author’s intellectual 
property is more truly property than other kinds of property.  If mere chattel 
or other common forms of property can be owned and transferred forever, 
then intellectual property a fortiori should be entitled to such benefits.132 
Pound’s reference to “the work of [an author’s] hands, or of his brain”133 
comes directly out of this tradition of applied Lockean labor theory, trailing with 
it implications of authorial natural rights.  But, as the quotation from Spencer 
also hints, this discourse drew as well upon a conception of the author as 
someone possessing unique personality and genius.  Spencer’s reference to the 
author’s “sentiments” glances at the Romantic underpinnings of copyright 
law as it developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  Scholars have 
examined this aesthetic and ideological dimension of copyright at length, noting 
that “the originality of the work, and consequently its value, becomes dependent 
on the individuality of the author,” and also that the notion of authorial 
personality dovetailed with “Locke’s primary axiom” that property arises from the 
mixing of the laborer’s “person” with the elements of the commons.134 
                                                                                                                            
 131. HERBERT SPENCER, JUSTICE: BEING PART IV OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ETHICS § 60, at 
108–09 (London, Williams & Norgate 1891). 
 132. See also BIRRELL, supra note 113, at 14 (observing of eighteenth-century copyright polemics 
that it was believed that if authors could claim a “property” right in their writings “in the same way as 
lands, houses, goods and chattels, it followed that this right was one of indefinite duration, and could be 
so disposed of in the market inter vivos, or bequeathed or left to descend to relatives according to the laws 
of inheritance”).  Lawrence Lessig has used more homely terms to describe attempts to analogize 
intellectual property to traditional forms of property: 
“Property,” ordinary people think, is “absolute and mine forever.”  If you say to ordinary 
people, “What do you think of the idea of fair use of your property, or only having your 
property for limited times?,” they are likely to think, “Well, that’s weird.  You don’t have a fair 
use right to my car, nor are you able to say after a limited time the state can come in and take 
away my house.”   
Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 FLA. L. REV. 763, 775–76 (2003). 
 133. Pound, Tariff and Copyright, supra note 118, at 228. 
 134. See ROSE, supra note 17, at 121.  Scholars and critics have extensively explored how 
“[o]riginality became the watchword of artistry and the warrant for property rights.”  JAMES BOYLE, 
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION 
SOCIETY 54 (1996); see also generally id. at 51–60 (arguing that the Romantic theory of authorship 
arose as a solution to various ideological tensions within the concepts of property, authorship, the public 
and the private); Martha Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of 
the Emergence of the ‘Author’, 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425 (1984) (tracing the growth of the 
meaning of the author, the book, and writing as property in the eighteenth century). 
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Given the growing ideological connection between originality and liter-
ary property, it should be no surprise that William Wordsworth, the dominant 
British Romantic poet of the first half of the nineteenth century, was a passionate 
advocate of strong copyright protection for works of genius.  He believed that 
lengthy copyright terms were necessary for original writings because, unlike 
popular books, their innovations were slow to find a receptive audience and so 
yielded monetary returns late, if ever, in their authors’ lifetimes.135  Long 
copyrights would also help ensure that authors’ descendants received financial 
benefits when innovative works finally came into their own.136 
Wordsworth famously recorded his disdain for opponents of strong 
copyright protection in his sonnet “A Plea for Authors, May 1838,” in which he 
warned that “social Justice” would become “a mockery and a shame” if it did not 
show reverence for “natural rights.”137  Combining Lockean natural rights with a 
salute to Romantic “Genius,” Wordsworth declared that only a longer copyright 
term—a “lengthened privilege”—could properly incentivize and protect the 
“streams of truth” that flowed from their source in original authorship.138  The 
sonnet goes on to assert that the “Law” would be but a “servile dupe of false 
pretence” if it “guard[ed] grossest things from common claim / Now and for ever” 
but begrudged a “short-lived fence” to “works that came / From mind and 
spirit.”139  This is the a fortiori argument that was advanced some decades later by 
Herbert Spencer: If chattel and other common forms of property (“grossest 
things”140) are protected forever from theft and trespass, how can legislators 
withhold a similar right from the lofty creations of the intellect? 
                                                                                                                            
 135. See William Wordsworth, Letter to the Editor, KENDAL MERCURY, Apr. 12, 1838, 
reprinted in 3 THE PROSE WORKS OF WILLIAM WORDSWORTH 309, 312 (W.J.B. Owen & Jane 
Worthington Smyser eds., 1974) (arguing that longer copyrights would encourage “the production 
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notion of copyright reformers Wordsworth and Thomas Noon Talfourd that longer copyright 
terms were necessitated by the nature of original works); MARTHA WOODMANSEE, THE AUTHOR, 
ART, AND THE MARKET: REREADING THE HISTORY OF AESTHETICS 145–46 (1994) (discussing 
Wordsworth’s argument for longer copyright terms for original works). 
 136. See WOODMANSEE, supra note 135, at 145–46.  The poet and essayist Thomas Hood, a 
contemporary of Wordsworth, summarized the Wordsworthian argument by noting that “works of 
permanent value and utility . . . often creep but slowly into circulation and repute,” and that “just 
then, when the literary property is realized . . . the law decrees that then all right or interest in the 
book shall expire in the author, and by some strange process, akin to the Hindoo transmigrations, 
revive in the great body of the booksellers.”  THOMAS HOOD, Copyright and Copywrong, Letter I, in 
PROSE AND VERSE, supra note 14, at 73, 80. 
 137. 2 WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, A Plea for Authors, May 1838 (1838), in THE POEMS 818, 
818 ll. 3–4 (John O. Hayden ed., 1977). 
 138. Id. ll. 9, 13–14. 
 139. Id. ll. 5–8. 
 140. Id. l. 6. 
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Wordsworth’s blending of labor theory and the ordinary-property argu-
ment is present as well in Pound’s justification for a perpetual copyright.  Pound 
combines the Locke-like reference to “the work of [an author’s] hands, or of his 
brain” with the assertion that he should be able to bequeath his copyright 
royalties “with as much security as if [he] had acquired oil stock, or government 
bonds, instead of producing literature.”141  Even more emphatically than 
Wordsworth and Spencer, Pound argues that the law’s recognition of perpetual 
rights in common forms of property like oil stock and government bonds—
Wordsworth’s “grossest things”—renders anomalous its failure to offer the same 
protection to literary property. 
While overt references to authorial genius are absent from Pound’s New 
Age article, the Romantic justification for authorial property is nevertheless 
tacitly present.  In another essay published only a month earlier, Pound 
announced that “[a]rtists are the antennae of the race” and that “it is the business 
of the artist to make humanity aware of itself.”142  In Pound’s view, artists—by 
which he meant authors as well as other kinds of creators—have a superior 
awareness of reality and a responsibility to enhance others’ awareness.143  This 
definition of artists is not unlike the famous assertion of the Romantic poet 
Percy Bysshe Shelley that “[p]oets are the unacknowledged legislators of the 
world.”144  In his New Age article, Pound sought to be both the sensitive, 
prescient “antenna[]” of Anglo-American cultural relations and, literally, a 
legislator of world copyright. 
2. Nineteenth-Century Royalty Schemes and Anti-Monopoly Reform 
Pound’s statute is Janus-faced.  One aspect gazes off into the realm of 
perpetual copyright; the other more mundanely scrutinizes the practical needs 
of the public.  The latter imperative he addresses by proposing a compulsory-
license or royalty system145 that is triggered when authors or their heirs fail or 
refuse to keep affordable reprints and translations in circulation, or when a 
successful work reaches sales of 100,000 and a cheap edition is necessary to 
                                                                                                                            
 141. Pound, supra note 8, at 208. 
 142. Ezra Pound, In Explanation, LITTLE REV., Aug. 1918, at 5, 8, reprinted in 3 POETRY AND 
PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 4, at 142, 144. 
 143. Id. 
 144. PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY, A DEFENCE OF POETRY (1821), reprinted in THE SELECTED POETRY 
AND PROSE OF PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY 494, 522 (Carlos Baker ed., Random House 1951). 
 145. I use the terms “compulsory license” and “royalty scheme” interchangeably, recognizing 
that they can have different connotations.  Cf. Gordon, A Property Right, supra note 94, at 1574 
n.204 (“Viewed retrospectively, a liability rule operates like a monetary remedy for violation of a 
right.  Viewed prospectively, a liability rule might be viewed as granting potential defendants a 
compulsory license to use a creators’ product.”). 
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satisfy popular demand.146  Although Pound’s broad compulsory licenses may 
have struck readers as unusual in 1918, they had distinct nineteenth-century 
antecedents in Britain, the United States, and other countries. 
Proposals to adopt royalty schemes or compulsory licenses for solving the 
problems of international copyright were not unknown in nineteenth-century 
America.147  In 1887, the Philadelphia author and revivalist preacher Robert 
Pearsall Smith advocated a system by which any American publisher would 
be free to reprint any foreign book upon payment to the author of 10 percent 
of the retail price.148  This fixed royalty was to be paid, prior to publication, by 
purchasing from the author a quantity of “stamps” equal to the number of 
copies to be printed.149  Only books bearing authentic stamps would be regarded 
as genuine articles, and there would be suggested penalties for issuing unstamped 
books.150  Although it met with the “quasi approval” of some noted British 
authors, Pearsall Smith’s idea was assailed as a “crude and visionary scheme[]”151 
on various grounds: authors and publishers know better than the government 
how to fix proper compensation for authors; such a proposal would invade the 
“trust” relationship between authors and publishers and limit their freedom of 
contract; authors would lose control over the quality and accuracy of their 
texts; and publishers would be wary of investing in the production of a successful 
book if other publishers could come along and compete cheaply.152 
Royalty schemes and compulsory licenses were introduced or proposed in 
other countries as well.  The British Copyright Act of 1842 contained a provision 
permitting a complaint to be filed with the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council if a copyright proprietor refused to allow the reprinting of a book after 
the death of its author; the statute empowered the Privy Council to grant a 
printing license to the complainant.153  According to a system in vogue in 
Italy around 1900, works that had entered their second forty years of copyright 
                                                                                                                            
 146. See supra notes 87–110 and accompanying text. 
 147. Such a scheme “was suggested in 1872 by John P. Morton, John Elderkin, and others, 
in connection with the attempt then made to secure international copyright.”  THE QUESTION OF 
COPYRIGHT, supra note 54, at 67.  Morton, a Louisville publisher, proposed that general publication of 
foreign works be permitted upon payment of a 10 percent royalty to the authors.  See BOWKER, supra 
note 59, at 352.  Elderkin’s recommendation of a 5 percent royalty was incorporated in a bill introduced 
in the House and the Senate in 1872.  Id. 
 148. Pearsall Smith’s proposal was published as An Olive Branch From America, in 22 NINETEENTH 
CENTURY 602 (1887).  It is summarized in THE QUESTION OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 54, at 65–76. 
 149. THE QUESTION OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 54, at 65. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 66. 
 152. Id. at 67–73; see also SEVILLE, supra note 37, at 226–27 (discussing Pearsall Smith’s 
royalty scheme). 
 153. Copyright Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45, § 5 (Eng.). 
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protection could be issued by any publisher upon payment of a fixed royalty.154  
“In Canada, as far back as 1872, a Bill was passed to permit Canadian publishers 
to reprint English copyright works, on payment of a royalty to the owner of the 
copyright.  This, however, failed to obtain the consent of the Crown.”155  
Three years later, a modified Canadian bill was ratified by the British Parliament, 
after the addition of protections for the British book trade.156  Moreover, Article 5 
of the Berne Convention as amended in 1896 provided that an author’s 
exclusive translation right would cease to exist “if the author shall not have 
availed himself of it, during a term of ten years from the date of the first 
publication of the original work, by publishing or causing to be published, in 
one of the countries of the Union, a translation in the language for which 
protection is to be claimed.”157 
The most concerted effort to introduce a full-fledged royalty system was 
made in Britain by members of the Royal Commission on Copyright of 1876–
78, established to make a thorough review of British copyright law and to 
recommend reforms.158  The membership was divided between those who sup-
ported traditional monopoly copyright and those who advocated a royalty 
system for fostering free trade and diffusion of cheap books.  According to one 
scholar, the Royal Commission was “a serious attempt from within the govern-
ment to abolish copyright law or at the very least rethink its immanent 
ideology and economics from a standpoint of free trade, and, at least puta-
tively, in the name of the public interest.”159 
                                                                                                                            
 154. BRIGGS, supra note 42, at 114; see also BOWKER, supra note 59, at 450 (discussing the 
Italian compulsory-license system); BIRRELL, supra note 113, at 38 (same). 
 155. BRIGGS, supra note 42, at 115.  
 156. See Copyright Act, 1875, 38 Vict., c. 88 (Eng.), amended by Copyright Act, 1875, 38 & 
39 Vict., c. 53 (Eng.); see also FEATHER, supra note 34, at 185 (discussing the 1875 bill); SAINT-
AMOUR, supra note 114, at 61 (same). 
 157. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886 (amended 
May 4, 1896), art. 5, supra note 66, at 228.  The 1896 amendment altered the 1886 text’s flat 10-
year term for the author’s translation right.  Id. art. 5(1), at 228 (“Authors . . . shall enjoy in the 
other countries the exclusive right of making or authorizing the translation of their works until 
the expiration of ten years from the publication of the original work in one of the countries of the 
Union.”).  The amendment allowed the author to retain an exclusive translation right beyond ten 
years, but only on the condition that the author made diligent use of that right, as in Pound’s 
statute.  As Briggs observed: “If during this ten years’ period—commonly called délai d’usage—the 
author does not himself publish a translation of his work, his exclusive translating right lapses 
altogether, and anyone is at liberty to translate his work into any language . . . .”  BRIGGS, supra 
note 42, at 114.  Great Britain was an original signatory to the Berne Convention of 1886, which 
applied to Canada as a colony of Great Britain.  Sunny Handa, A Review of Canada’s International 
Copyright Obligations, 42 MCGILL L.J. 961, 969 (1997).  Britain also acceded to the 1896 version 
of Berne.  Lionel Bently, Copyright, Translations, and Relations Between Britain and India in the 
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1181, 1186 (2007). 
 158. See SAINT-AMOUR, supra note 114, at 55. 
 159. Id. 
1806 56 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1775 (2009) 
 
 
T.H. Farrer, Permanent Secretary to the Board of Trade and one of the 
chief proponents of what was called “royalty copyright,”160 testified before 
the Commission that he believed a royalty system to be preferable to monopoly 
copyright as a means of protecting British authors’ interests and disseminating 
their works in Britain, the United States, and Canada: 
The ideal of a copyright system is that it should be co-extensive with 
the English language, giving the author the benefit of an enormous 
market, and the reader the benefit of a price proportionately reduced.  
But in order to effect this, monopoly must be in some way restricted.  
And I have heard of no means of doing this which sounds practicable 
except that of a right of republication with a royalty.161 
Despite the vigorous efforts of Farrer and the other free-trade members, the 
Commission voted to retain monopoly copyright, and the Commission’s report 
so reflected: “We have arrived at the conclusion that copyright should continue 
to be treated by law as a proprietary right, and that it is not expedient to 
substitute a right to a royalty defined by statute, or any other right of a similar 
kind.”162  Thus ended the last comprehensive attempt in Britain to substitute 
royalties and compulsory licenses for the system of copyright as it is known today. 
Of course, compulsory licenses would eventually enter copyright law in 
more limited forms.  By the time Ezra Pound came to draft his statute, both 
British and U.S. copyright laws had “mechanical license” provisions that 
allowed anyone to reproduce copyrighted musical works on records, piano 
rolls, and other devices without permission, as long as the copyright owner 
had authorized at least one earlier mechanical reproduction of the work and 
the user paid a fixed royalty per copy.163  The 1911 British Copyright Act also 
retained a version of the old Privy Council license for post mortem reprints in 
certain circumstances,164 and included another compulsory license permitting 
anyone to reprint the published work of an author who had been dead for 
                                                                                                                            
 160. Other prominent proponents included Sir Louis Mallet, Under Secretary of State for 
India, formerly at the Board of Trade, and Robert Andrew Macfie, a former Liberal member of 
Parliament.  For accounts of the 1876–78 Royal Commission on Copyright, see FEATHER, supra 
note 34, at 185–95; SAINT-AMOUR, supra note 114, at 53–89; SEVILLE, supra note 37, at 268–78. 
 161. Farrer’s (Board of Trade) Evidence, in R.A. MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS FOR 
INVENTIONS: PLEAS AND PLANS FOR CHEAPER BOOKS AND GREATER INDUSTRIAL FREEDOM, 
WITH DUE REGARD TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THE CLAIMS OF TALENT, THE DEMANDS 
OF TRADE, AND THE WANTS OF PEOPLE 294, 299 (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1879). 
 162. Extracts From Report of Royal Commission on Copyright, in MACFIE, supra note 161, 
at 274, 274. 
 163. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(e), 35 Stat. 1075, 1076; Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 
Geo. 5, c. 46, § 19 (Eng.). 
 164. Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 4 (Eng.).  For a discussion of the Privy Council 
license contained in the British Copyright Act of 1842, see supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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twenty-five years, upon written notice and payment of a 10 percent retail 
royalty to the copyright proprietor.165 
The compulsory-license provisions in the 1909 U.S. Act and the 1911 
British Act reflected a legislative awareness of situations in which arm’s-length 
bargaining between copyright owners and aspiring users would be difficult or 
undesirable.166  But none of these provisions was as sweeping and aggressive as 
the royalty reforms urged by the anti-monopoly minority members of the 
1876–78 Royal Commission on Copyright.  Pound’s compulsory-license propos-
als, in their expansiveness and public-mindedness, hearken back to the free-trade 
spirit of those Commissioners.  Moreover, the stark contrast within Pound’s 
proposal between a perpetual copyright and easily-triggered royalty provisions 
echoes the sharp philosophical and ideological divisions within the Commission 
between advocacy of a strong monopoly right and calls for anti-monopoly 
mechanisms for making cheap books available to a wide readership.  Pound 
was the inheritor of both traditions, and the tensions are evident in his copyright 
statute.  In the final analysis, however, as shown in Parts III and IV, he was 
more an anti-monopoly free-trader than a perpetual-rights diehard. 
III. LITERARY IMPLICATIONS OF POUND’S PROPOSED STATUTE 
A. International Copyright and Communication Among Nations 
Pound envisioned an international copyright law that would provide 
authors fair remuneration for their intellectual labor but would not stand in 
the way of wide, and, if necessary, statutorily compelled, dissemination of their 
works and translations at affordable prices.  He believed that, with America’s 
entry into “Armageddon,”167 the need for cross-cultural communication among 
writers and thinkers was more urgent than ever, and he sought to eliminate 
the barriers raised by “the red tape and insecurity of the copyright regula-
tions” and high American book tariffs.168  Such “hindrance[s] to international 
                                                                                                                            
 165. Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 3 (Eng.). 
 166. Modern copyright statutes have added further compulsory or statutory licenses.  See, 
e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(c)–(d) (2006) (secondary transmissions by cable systems), 114(d) (certain 
digital transmissions of sound recordings), 119 (certain secondary transmissions by satellite 
carriers), 122 (same).  In the United Kingdom, compulsory licenses exist for use of works whose 
copyrights were revived in the mid-1990s as a result of a European Union Directive (Council 
Directive 93/98, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9) requiring EU member countries to implement a term of 
copyright protection equal to the life of the author plus 70 years.  See Duration of Copyright and 
Rights in Performances Regs., 1995, S.I. 1995, No. 3297, ¶¶ 24, 25. 
 167. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 168. Pound, supra note 105, at 190. 
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communication,” Pound wrote, were “serious at any time, and doubly serious 
now when we are trying to understand France and England more intimately.”169 
Pound believed that now and again a gifted author emerges as an 
unofficial communicator among nations, a sort of literary ambassador-interpreter 
with the ability to “translate” the meaning of one culture for the benefit of 
other cultures.170  A month or so before his copyright proposal appeared in 
The New Age, Pound edited a special issue of the New York literary magazine 
The Little Review, which was devoted to the American writer Henry James.171  
James’s recurrent theme in The American (1877), The Portrait of a Lady 
(1881), The Ambassadors (1903), and other works of fiction had been the 
moral and cultural implications of the encounter between Americans and 
Europeans and the differences between the New World and the Old.  Like 
Pound, James had lived as an American expatriate in England and had deplored 
the coming of the Great War.172  In The Little Review, Pound wrote that 
James—who had died in 1916—had spent a “life-time . . . in trying to make 
two continents understand each other, in trying . . . to make three nations 
[Britain, France, and the United States] intelligible one to another.”173  James, 
Pound observed, was a “hater of tyranny” whose entire career had been a 
“labour of translation, of making America intelligible, of making it possible 
for individuals to meet across national borders.”174 
As Pound saw it, James had been a literary laborer for world peace.  
“Peace comes of communication,” Pound observed in one of his essays on 
James.175  “The whole of great art is a struggle for communication.  All things 
set against this are evil whether they be silly scoffing or obstructive tariffs.”176  
                                                                                                                            
 169. Id. 
 170. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text (discussing Pound’s notion that writers 
have a special ability to perceive realities and communicate them to the world); see also Pound, supra 
note 142, at 145 (“No man of our time has so laboured to create means of communication as did the late 
Henry Jaems [sic]. . . . And this communication is not a levelling, it is not an elimination of [national 
and cultural] differences.  It is a recognition of differences, of the right of differences to exist, of interest 
in finding things different.”). 
 171. See LITTLE REV., Aug. 1918. 
 172. See JONATHAN ATKIN, A WAR OF INDIVIDUALS: BLOOMSBURY ATTITUDES TO THE 
GREAT WAR 79 (2002); see also Letter From Henry James to Howard Sturgis (Aug. 4, 1914), in 2 
THE LETTERS OF HENRY JAMES 382, 384 (Percy Lubbock ed., 1920) (referring to the just-declared 
war as “a nightmare of the deepest dye,” and asking, “How can what is going on not be to one as a 
huge horror of blackness?”). 
 173. Pound, supra note 142, at 143. 
 174. Id. at 143–44.  For a discussion of Pound’s treatment of James as a cultural communicator, see 
generally the chapter entitled Ezra Pound’s American Scenes: Henry James and the Labour of Translation, 
in DANIEL KATZ, AMERICAN MODERNISM’S EXPATRIATE SCENE: THE LABOUR OF TRANSLATION 53–
70 (2007). 
 175. Pound, supra note 142, at 145. 
 176. Id. 
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Pound’s campaign to reform copyright laws and book tariffs was consistent 
with James’s attempts to remove cultural barriers through the creation of fic-
tional worlds.  For Pound, a reformed copyright law would serve as a legal 
counterpart to James’s efforts to get nations to understand each other.  As he 
wrote in his New Age article, forging an international copyright law would 
require “reciprocal intelligence and reciprocal action between England and 
America.”177  James’s novels demonstrate the same need by showing how impor-
tant and yet how difficult it is for different cultures to achieve reciprocity.178 
Pound’s belief that communication was a panacea for international strife 
reflected a simplicity that sometimes bordered on the shockingly naïve.  He was 
so convinced that honest, unhampered communication could change the minds 
of belligerent nations that later, when the Second World War came, he 
seized the opportunity of a Rome Radio microphone to broadcast passionate 
denunciations of Britain, the United States, and international finance.179  In 
1945, writing from an American detention camp near Pisa where he was 
being held on charges of treason, Pound still hoped that his Rome Radio work 
had helped the cause of peace: “What I am in absolute ignorance of is: whether 
anyone actually heard my broadcasts; whether they did any good, by which I 
mean whether they in any way contributed to a better understanding [in Britain 
and the United States] of certain economic fundamentals.”180  By 1945, Pound 
had traveled far from the comparatively tame zealotry of proposing copyright 
reforms at the end of the first war, yet his professed motive was the same: 
spreading mutual understanding among nations. 
                                                                                                                            
 177. Id.  Henry James also took an interest in international copyright law and used it as the 
basis of a witty colloquy, An Animated Conversation, first published in Scribner’s Magazine in 1889.  
Like Pound, James refers to American book piracy and the U.S. tariff on cultural products.  
HENRY JAMES, An Animated Conversation, in ESSAYS IN LONDON AND ELSEWHERE 267, 280–85 
(New York, Harper & Bros, 1893).   
 178. For example, the plot of James’s novel The American revolves around the experiences of 
a wealthy, retired American businessman, Christopher Newman, who travels to France and there 
meets and falls in love with a French noblewoman, Claire de Cintré.  In this encounter between 
the Old and New Worlds, Christopher and Claire are driven apart by her corrupt, aristocratic family, 
who cannot reconcile themselves to Christopher’s unsophisticated, egalitarian nature and his 
former career as a “commercial person.”  HENRY JAMES, THE AMERICAN 371 (Houghton Mifflin 
Co. 1907) (1877).  Pound observed: “In his books [James] showed race against race, immutable; 
the essential Americanness, or Englishness or Frenchness—in The American, the difference between 
one nation and another; not flag-waving and treaties, not the machinery of government, but ‘why’ 
there is always misunderstanding, why men of different race are not the same.”  Pound, supra note 
142, at 145. 
 179. LETTERS IN CAPTIVITY, supra note 7, at 2–4. 
 180. Letter From Pound to Shakespear & Parkyn (Oct. 5, 1945), in LETTERS IN CAPTIVITY, 
supra note 7, at 107, 111. 
1810 56 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1775 (2009) 
 
 
B. Competing With the Dead: Copyright and the Public Domain 
Like many of his fellow modernists, Pound viewed contemporary writers 
as in a struggle with literary predecessors who, because they were established 
and familiar, more readily commanded the attention and respect of readers.181  
Lamenting the reluctance of the public to expand its tastes to include modern 
artists, Pound wrote in 1917, “The British public liked, has liked, likes and 
always will like all art, music, poetry, literature, glass engraving, sculpture, 
etc. in just such measure as it approaches the Tennysonian tone.”182  Critics 
have noted that modernist authors’ relationships to their predecessors were 
intensely competitive and often fraught with anxiety.183  Harold Bloom, for 
example, has claimed that T.S. Eliot’s “true and always unnamed precursor 
was . . . an uneasy composite of Tennyson and Whitman.”184  Modernists 
frequently registered their sense of rivalry with earlier authors in the form of 
ridicule or dismissiveness.  Eliot once wrote that Tennyson had “a large dull 
brain like a farmhouse clock.”185  Pound wickedly mocked Tennyson’s status 
as Poet Laureate by pointing to “the edifying spectacle of . . . Tennyson in 
Buckingham Palace.”186  “Wordsworth is a dull sheep,” Pound wrote in 1916, 
                                                                                                                            
 181. Modernism’s generational competitiveness has often been noted by scholars.  See 
generally LOUISE BLAKENEY WILLIAMS, MODERNISM AND THE IDEOLOGY OF HISTORY: LITERATURE, 
POLITICS, AND THE PAST 21–38 (2002) (discussing five modernist writers—Ezra Pound, T.S. 
Eliot, W.B. Yeats, Ford Madox Ford, and D.H. Lawrence—and their sense of Victorian culture as burden 
and rival); see also id. at 31 (discussing modernists’ uncomfortable awareness that their Victorian 
counterparts “were respected, they sold books, they made money, they forced their audience to 
think, and they occasionally even produced results”); id. (“[T]he Modernists envied the fact that the 
Victorians were responsible to the world and were taken seriously.”); Jane Lilienfeld, Flesh and Blood and 
Love and Words: Lily Briscoe, Stephen Dedalus, and the Aesthetics of Emotional Quest, in NEW ALLIANCES 
IN JOYCE STUDIES: “WHEN IT’S APED TO FOUL A DELFIAN” 165, 166 (Bonnie Kime Scott ed., 1988) 
(“Modernism, as a literary movement, resolutely set its face against the Victorian aesthetic of an art 
expected to offer beauty, solace, and moral uplift.  Modernism despised Victorian expressions of feeling as 
sentimental, weak, and embarrassing.”). 
 182. Ezra Pound, The Rev. G. Crabbe, LL.B., 1 FUTURE 110, 110 (1917), reprinted in 2 
POETRY AND PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 4, at 188, 188.  Lord Alfred Tennyson (1809–
1892), author of numerous books of poetry, succeeded William Wordsworth as England’s poet 
laureate in 1850.  See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO ENGLISH LITERATURE 808 (Sir Paul Harvey 
ed., 4th ed. rev. 1967). 
 183. See, e.g., MARY ELLIS GIBSON, EPIC REINVENTED: EZRA POUND AND THE VICTORIANS 
14 (1995) (discussing Pound’s “resistance . . . to . . . certain Victorian predecessors, notably Tennyson 
and the Pre-Raphaelites”). 
 184. HAROLD BLOOM, THE BREAKING OF THE VESSELS 21 (1982). 
 185. Apteryx (T.S. Eliot), Verse Pleasant and Unpleasant, 5 EGOIST 43, 43 (1918). 
 186. Ezra Pound, How to Read, or Why: Part III: Conclusions, Exceptions, Curricula, N.Y. HERALD 
TRIB. BOOKS, Jan. 27, 1929, reprinted in 5 POETRY AND PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 4, at 
116, 117. 
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and “Byron’s technique is rotten.”187  Matthew Arnold was limited by his 
“mind’s frigidity.”188  In her famous essay “Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown,” Virginia 
Woolf took to task precursor novelists such as H.G. Wells and Arnold Bennett 
for failing to treat “life” as “human nature.”189  These novelists “have made 
tools and established conventions which do their business,” Woolf wrote.190  
“But those tools are not our tools, and that business is not our business.  For 
us those conventions are ruin, those tools are death.”191  The sense of a gulf 
between the present generation and previous ones, between us and them, 
pervades the writings of modernist authors. 
For Pound, however, rivalry with the past was more than aesthetic com-
petition; it had a distinct economic dimension.  If books were too expensive, 
they would fail to make their mark on culture, no matter how important their 
contents.  “Only cheap good books can compete with cheap bad books,” he 
noted in his discussion of the costs imposed by the U.S. book tariff.192  Copyright 
played an important role in this contest between present and past authors.  
Among the reasons Pound gave in his 1918 New Age article for advocating a 
perpetual copyright was that “the present law by which copyright expires 
permits dead authors to compete on unjust terms with living authors.  
Unscrupulous, but well-meaning publishers, well serving the public, print 
dead authors more cheaply than living ones BECAUSE they do not have to pay 
royalties.”193  Thus, in addition to the advantage they held by having shaped 
the tastes of present readers and ingratiated themselves through passage of 
time, “dead authors”194 could undersell contemporary authors because their 
works had shed copyright protection and were free for the taking.  “This is to 
the disadvantage of contemporary literature, to the disadvantage of literary 
production,” Pound declared.195  Publishers could reprint the deceased 
                                                                                                                            
 187. Letter From Pound to Iris Barry (July 27, 1916), in SELECTED LETTERS OF EZRA 
POUND: 1907–1941, at 88, 90 (D.D. Paige ed., 1970). 
 188. EZRA POUND, THE SPIRIT OF ROMANCE 222 (rev. ed. 1968). 
 189. VIRGINIA WOOLF, Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown (1924), in 1 COLLECTED ESSAYS 319, 
330 (Leonard Woolf ed., 1966). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Pound, supra note 105, at 191.  By “cheap bad books” Pound probably had in mind 
popular literature and best-sellers rather than public-domain works of literary significance.  But he 
believed throughout his career that inexpensive new books were critical for the spread of 
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to Dorothy Pound (Oct. 14, 1945), in LETTERS IN CAPTIVITY, supra note 7, at 131 (remarking of 
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 193. Pound, supra note 8, at 208–09. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
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Tennyson’s public-domain texts,196 for example, without the additional overhead 
of copyright royalties.  In this respect, modernist authors were handicapped 
even when copyright law succeeded in protecting them.197 
Pound’s solution to this competitive imbalance between living and dead 
authors was the radical one of making copyrights perpetual “from present 
date.”198  Because the public domain, regularly augmented by expiring 
copyrights, would always contain a ready supply of works of high quality, 
eliminating this free resource was the only way to redress the competitive 
imbalance.199  But there are questions that Pound does not answer.  Would 
only future works come within his statute, or would existing copyrights be 
extended for eternity as well?  Would the statute also retroactively restore 
copyright to works that had previously entered the public domain when their 
statutory terms expired?  Would it go further and grant protection to works 
such as Beowulf and Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales that predated copyright 
regimes altogether?  Would other world classics such as The Odyssey and The 
Divine Comedy—texts that Pound regularly drew upon for his own creative 
work—be included?200  These questions are not irrelevant.  According to Pound’s 
                                                                                                                            
 196. Under the British Copyright Act of 1842, copyrights endured for the author’s life plus 
seven years or until forty-two years after first publication, whichever term was longer.  Copyright 
Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Vict., c. 45, § 3 (Eng.).  This means that many of Tennyson’s important works—
such as The Princess: A Medley (1847), In Memoriam (1850), The Charge of the Light Brigade 
(1854), and Maud, and Other Poems (1855)—entered the public domain in Britain in 1899, seven 
years after his death in 1892. 
 197. Whether and to what extent Pound’s belief that contemporary works cost more than 
public-domain works reflected the reality of the book trade in 1918 is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  However, examples of expensive modernist works are not hard to find.  In 1922, James 
Joyce used his monopoly power in France to market the limited first edition of Ulysses there at 
prices ranging from $14.00 to $30.00—a substantial sum of money at the time.  LAWRENCE 
RAINEY, INSTITUTIONS OF MODERNISM: LITERARY ELITES AND PUBLIC CULTURE 62–64 (1998).  
The same power enabled Joyce to extract from his publisher 66 percent of the net profits from that 
edition.  Id. at 64. 
 198. Pound, supra note 8, at 208. 
 199. A variation on Pound’s worry over competition with the dead is the concern expressed 
by some authors that a shorter copyright term would allow early versions of their own works to 
enter the public domain and compete cheaply with later, revised versions of the same works that 
were protected by copyright.  Wordsworth, for example, was distressed that he would not be able 
to control the reprinting of his youthful writings after they had passed out of copyright.  See 
ZACHARY LEADER, REVISION AND ROMANTIC AUTHORSHIP 75–77 (1996) (discussing 
Wordsworth’s frustration over publishers who exploited expiring copyrights in an author’s early, 
unrevised writings). 
 200. See generally STEPHEN SICARI, POUND’S EPIC AMBITION: DANTE AND THE MODERN 
WORLD 1–16 (1991) (discussing Pound’s use in his poetry of Homer, Dante, and other epic 
writers).  For example, the opening canto of Pound’s major poetic sequence, The Cantos, contains 
his translation of a substantial portion of Book 11 of Homer’s Odyssey: the story of Odysseus’ visit 
to the underworld to speak with the shade of the prophet Tiresias.  CANTOS OF EZRA POUND ll. 
1–67, at 3–5 (13th prtg. 1995) [hereinafter CANTOS]; see also GEORGE KEARNS, GUIDE TO EZRA 
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logic, only a complete abolition of the public domain would place all authors—
past, present, and future—on a level economic playing field.  Anything less 
would give some portion of the dead an unfair advantage over the living. 
A statutory scheme that left part of the public domain intact—and this 
would be almost inevitable—would sustain to some degree the competitive 
imbalance of which Pound complained.  But he probably did not have in mind 
an economic rivalry with Homer, Dante, Shakespeare, or other classic authors.  
Rather, it was competition from authors who had more recently entered, or 
were entering, the public domain—for example, Wordsworth, Tennyson, and 
Matthew Arnold—that Pound likely thought would have the greatest impact 
on contemporary writers’ sales and ambitions.201  These new additions to the 
public domain were among the Romantic and Victorian predecessors with 
whom Pound and other modernist writers felt a keen sense of rivalry.202 
Moreover, within the United States, the copyright law’s double standard 
for foreign authors had created the anomalous situation in which American 
authors, already at a disadvantage as comparative newcomers to world litera-
ture, saw their books marketed at monopoly prices while pirated British works 
were sold at bargain rates.  In 1819, the American author Washington Irving 
had written that “the public complains of the price of my work—this is the 
disadvantage of coming in competition with those republished English works 
                                                                                                                            
POUND’S SELECTED CANTOS 17–21 (1980) (discussing Pound’s translation from Book 11 of The 
Odyssey).  In addition, in Cantos 14 and 15—known as the “Hell Cantos”—Pound paints a sordid 
picture of greed and usury modeled, in general, on Dante’s Inferno.  SICARI, supra, at 36.  The first 
line of Canto 14 is a direct quotation from The Inferno: “Io venni in luogo d’ogni luce muto.”  
CANTOS, supra l. 1, at 61; see also SICARI, supra, at 36 (discussing Pound’s quotation from Dante 
in Canto 14). 
 201. Under the British Copyright Act of 1842, many of Tennyson’s major poetic works entered 
the public domain in 1899, seven years after his death.  See supra note 196.  Later works by Tennyson, 
such as Tiresias, and Other Poems (1885), which were still in copyright when Britain adopted the 1911 
Copyright Act, benefited from that Act’s extension of copyright terms to fifty years after the 
author’s death.  Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 3 (Eng.); see also KEVIN GARNETT ET 
AL., COPINGER & SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT § 5-148 (2005) (“The term of copyright 
conferred by the 1911 Act in respect of published works was longer than that subsisting under the 
pre-existing law, and this longer term was conferred on existing works which were still in copyright 
at the commencement date of the 1911 Act.”).  Thus, when Pound proposed his copyright statute in 
1918, many of Tennyson’s earlier works had entered the public domain, but his later works were 
still in copyright.  The case of Matthew Arnold, who died in 1888, was similar.  All of Wordsworth’s 
writings, however, had entered the public domain by 1918.  Under the 1842 Act, the copyrights 
in Wordsworth’s works began to expire in 1857, seven years after his death, and continued to do 
so until 1892.  See supra note 196; Stephen Gill, Copyright and the Publishing of Wordsworth, 1850–
1900, in LITERATURE IN THE MARKETPLACE: NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH PUBLISHING AND 
READING PRACTICES 74, 76 (John O. Jordan & Robert L. Patten eds., 1995). 
 202. See supra notes 181–191 and accompanying text. 
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for which the Booksellers have not to pay any thing to the authors.”203  Nearly 
one hundred years later, Pound echoed Irving’s frustration, with a twist: “As 
America has less past literature than other countries it is particularly to American 
disadvantage that the living author should not fare as well as the dead one.”204  
Pound evidently meant that contemporary American authors had to vie not 
only with pirated contemporary European authors, but also with centuries of 
unprotected Old World matter.  The burden of the past weighed even more 
heavily when economic advantages were added to historical and cultural ones. 
C. Significant Omissions From Pound’s Statute 
By including compulsory-license provisions in his copyright statute, 
Pound ensures that the public will not be deprived of reprints and transla-
tions.  But his statute does not address other copyright-related rights and 
activities.  For example, apart from translations, Pound offers no discussion of 
derivative works, such as dramatic or cinematic adaptations, or of performance 
rights, though by 1918 copyright laws addressed all these issues in one way or 
another.205  Nor does Pound show any solicitude for fair use or fair dealing, a 
doctrine that had recently been codified in Britain.206  Yet adaptation rights 
and fair use are vital to the creative process, as Pound the poet surely knew.  
                                                                                                                            
 203. Letter From Washington Irving to Henry Brevoort (Aug. 12, 1819), in 1 WASHINGTON 
IRVING, LETTERS 1802–1823, at 553, 554 (Ralph M. Aderman et al. eds., 1978).  “In 1834 the 
average retail cost of a volume was $1.20 for American authors, and 75c for British and other 
foreign reprints.”  SEVILLE, supra note 37, at 150. 
 204. Pound, supra note 8, at 209. 
 205. For example, the 1911 British Copyright Act protected an author’s right to convert a 
dramatic work into a nondramatic work, and vice versa, and the right of public performance, including 
the performance of a translation.  Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 1(2) (Eng.).  Similar 
provisions were included in the 1909 U.S. Copyright Act.  Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(b)-(e), 35 
Stat. 1075, 1075–76.  Pound referred to such subsidiary rights in a 1930 article in which he criticized 
Congress’s slowness to enact a revision of the copyright laws: “[T]he welfare of letters is postponed until 
cinema and radio, and by now I suppose talki-o and smellio, rights have been puddled and 
muddled and strained out to the satisfaction of all the ‘parties interested.’”  Pound, supra note 31, 
at 229. 
 206. See Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 2(1)(i) (Eng.) (defining fair dealing as 
use of a copyrighted work “for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, review, or newspaper 
summary”); see also SAINT-AMOUR, supra note 114, at 182 (discussing the codification of fair 
dealing in the 1911 Act).  In the United States, the roughly analogous privilege of fair use 
remained an exclusively common law doctrine until it was codified in the 1976 Copyright Act.  
See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  Pound did not refer directly to fair use or fair dealing, but he showed 
an awareness of the lawfulness of reasonable though unauthorized quotation when, in a periodical 
piece published in 1920 in which he quoted a portion of an article by Lord Monkswell, he remarked 
that readers “would probably be more diverted by a quotation in toto than by any ‘garbled excerpts’ I 
can give, but space and, perhaps, copyright, forbid an entire transcription.”  Ezra Pound, The 
Revolt of Intelligence (pt. VII), NEW AGE, Jan. 22, 1920, at 186, 186, reprinted in 4 POETRY AND 
PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 4, at 10, 11. 
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If Pound the legislator felt the need to include statutory provisions preventing 
authors and their heirs from blocking reprints and translations, why did he 
not incorporate comparable safeguards for other reasonable uses of 
copyrighted works? 
Most likely, Pound included in his statute only those matters that he 
believed needed urgent attention on an international level—perpetual copyright 
and rules for reprints and translations—leaving other matters to be dealt with 
by domestic legislation.  After all, duration of copyright, piracy, cheap reprints, 
timely translations—these were the issues that had dominated discussions of 
international copyright for the past century,207 and Pound was consciously 
entering that conversation and proposing a unified theory for the needs of 
authors and readers.  Moreover, the focus of Pound’s statute is less on the 
creative process than on the diffusion of affordable works with fair compensation 
to authors.  That was the pragmatic challenge that he chose to address: putting in 
place statutory machinery that would facilitate the kind of cross-cultural 
communication that Henry James had made the focus of his fiction-writing. 
Yet Pound’s omission of any discussion of fair use and derivative works 
(other than translations) is puzzling, because the freedom to create adapta-
tions of, and to borrow extensively from, others’ works is a defining feature of 
modernist writing.208  It is well known, for example, that portions of Pound’s 
major poetic sequence The Cantos were modeled on Homer’s Odyssey and 
Dante’s Divine Comedy, among other literary sources.209  James Joyce com-
posed and promoted his novel Ulysses as a modern-day epic based on The Odyssey 
and, to a lesser extent, on Hamlet and other works.210  Both The Cantos and 
Ulysses adapt and quote freely from texts that were copyrighted at the time,211 
                                                                                                                            
 207. See supra notes 33–61, 147–166, and accompanying text (discussing American book 
piracy, debates over copyright duration, and legislative proposals for compulsory-license schemes 
for making books more widely available). 
 208. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 59 (2003) (observing that “the echoing of the literature of the 
past has been a common device of modernist literature,” and citing as examples the works of James 
Joyce, T.S. Eliot, Franz Kafka, and W.B. Yeats). 
 209. See generally SICARI, supra note 200, at 1–16 (discussing Pound’s use in his Cantos of 
Homer, Dante, and other epic writers). 
 210. See generally STUART GILBERT, JAMES JOYCE’S ULYSSES: A STUDY (1930) (tracing in 
detail Joyce’s systematic use of Homer’s Odyssey in Ulysses); Jennifer Levine, Ulysses, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO JAMES JOYCE 122, 122–25 (Derek Attridge ed., 2d ed. 2004) 
(discussing Joyce’s use of The Odyssey and Hamlet in Ulysses). 
 211. See, e.g., CANTOS, supra note 200, at 24 (quoting phrases from Gustave Flaubert’s Un 
Coeur simple); id. at 190 (adapting and quoting from the writings of economic theorist, C.H. 
Douglas); id. at 470–71 (reproducing photographically pages from Gerhard (or Gerhart) Münch’s 
modern arrangement for violin and piano of a 16th-century musical composition); id. at 516 
(quoting from a poem by Padraic Colum); see also 1 CARROLL F. TERRELL, A COMPANION TO 
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and there is no indication that Pound or Joyce ever sought licenses.212  T.S. 
Eliot likewise perfected the craft of generating strikingly original verse by 
assembling mosaics of previous authorship, both ancient and modern.213  
Various poems by Marianne Moore contain precise and sometimes lengthy 
quotations from contemporaneous sources, such as books and magazines.214  
And many other examples could be cited.215 
It is hard to imagine literary modernism without its extensive and overt 
use of texts by others, yet that aspect of the writer’s craft does not seem to 
                                                                                                                            
THE CANTOS OF EZRA POUND 30 (1980) (noting Pound’s quotations from Flaubert’s Un Coeur 
simple); id. at 157–58 (identifying sources in C.H. Douglas’s writings for Pound’s borrowings); 2 id. 
at 389 (discussing Münch’s musical arrangement which Pound reproduced); id. at 432 (noting 
Pound’s quotation from Colum).  Each of these writers or composers was still living when Pound 
borrowed from these works, or had died recently enough for the works to have been protected by 
copyright in some countries: Flaubert (died 1880), see OXFORD COMPANION TO ENGLISH LITERATURE, 
supra note 182, at 302; Douglas (died 1952), see LETTERS IN CAPTIVITY, supra note 7, at 52; 
Münch (died 1988), see EZRA POUND, THE PISAN CANTOS 131 (Richard Sieburth ed., New 
Directions Books 2003) (1948); and Colum (died 1972), see OXFORD COMPANION TO IRISH 
LITERATURE 108 (Robert Welch ed., 1996).  As for Joyce’s Ulysses (first published in 1922), the 
first chapter of that novel adapts and quotes from, among other authors, Oscar Wilde, W.B. Yeats 
and Algernon Charles Swinburne.  See JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 6, 8–9, 13 (Hans Walter Gabler 
ed., Bodley Head 1986) (1922); see also DON GIFFORD, ULYSSES ANNOTATED: NOTES FOR JAMES 
JOYCE’S ULYSSES 16, 18, 21 (2d ed., rev. 1988) (identifying Joyce’s borrowings from Wilde, Yeats, 
and Swinburne).  The writings of Yeats, who lived until 1939, see OXFORD COMPANION TO 
ENGLISH LITERATURE, supra note 182, at 903, were protected by copyright in 1922 in many parts 
of the world.  Works by Wilde and Swinburne were also likely protected in many countries in 1922.  
Wilde had died in 1900.  See id. at 887.  Swinburne had died in 1909.  See id. at 793.  A later chapter of 
Ulysses borrows from and parodies at least five authors (Thomas Carlyle, John Henry Newman, Walter 
Pater, Thomas Huxley, and John Ruskin) whose works were still in copyright in 1922.  See SAINT-
AMOUR, supra note 114, at 181. 
 212. See generally SAINT-AMOUR, supra note 114, at 193–98 (discussing potentially copyrighted 
sources that Joyce drew upon, without permission, in Ulysses).  Interestingly, Pound did acknowledge 
the need to obtain copyright permissions in the scholarly context.  For his study of medieval 
literature, The Spirit of Romance, he obtained permission to use lengthy quotations from modern, 
copyrighted translations of the writings of Dante and Michelangelo.  POUND, supra note 188, at 7; 
see also Ezra Pound, The Poems of Cavalcanti, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Dec. 5, 1912, at 562, 
reprinted in 1 POETRY AND PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 4, at 110 (noting that it was “not 
practicable for reasons of copyright and so on” to include Dante Gabriel Rossetti’s modern translations 
of the 13th-century Italian poet Guido Cavalcanti in Pound’s own volume of Cavalcanti translations). 
 213. Eliot’s Notes to his major poetic sequence, The Waste Land, first published in 1922, 
indicate that the poem contains quotations from and paraphrases of numerous works potentially 
still in copyright in 1922 in various parts of the world, including works by F.H. Bradley, Hermann 
Hesse, Paul Verlaine, Richard Wagner, and Jessie L. Weston.  T.S. ELIOT, Notes on “The Waste 
Land”, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909–1962, at 70–76 (1963) [hereinafter COLLECTED POEMS]. 
 214. See, e.g., MARIANNE MOORE, An Octopus, in THE POEMS OF MARIANNE MOORE 167, 
167–72 (Grace Schulman ed., 2003); see also id. at 381–82 (listing sources for lines in An Octopus); Cary 
Nelson, Modern American Poetry, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AMERICAN MODERNISM 68, 
85–86 (Walter Kalaidjian ed., 2005) (discussing Moore’s use of quotation and comparing it to T.S. Eliot’s). 
 215. See LEONARD DIEPEVEEN, CHANGING VOICES: THE MODERN QUOTING POEM at viii 
(1993) (treating quotation as a defining feature of 20th-century poetry and noting that 
“appropriation of previously existing material may well be the aesthetic of [that] century”). 
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have concerned Pound in 1918 when he proposed his copyright statute.  
Although some of the most celebrated achievements of modernism, such as 
Ulysses (1922) and The Waste Land (1922), were not yet published, or not yet 
fully published,216 when Pound wrote his New Age article, the use of quota-
tion, allusion, and textual collage was already well established in Pound’s own 
literary practice and that of his contemporaries.217  That Pound saw no need 
to address issues of adaptation rights and fair use in any of his discussions of 
copyright suggests that he did not regard these kinds of literary borrowing as 
unlawful, unethical, or otherwise controversial.  Moreover, there is no record 
of Pound, Eliot, Joyce, or other modernist writers being challenged by copyright 
owners, either informally or by means of legal process. 
Had Pound and his fellow modernists produced their writings under 
today’s regime of intellectual-property laws, they likely would have met with 
legal obstacles or found it necessary to alter their literary practices to conform 
to a legal climate more jealously protective of authors’ rights than in 1918.218  
As Paul Saint-Amour noted in 2003 with respect to Joyce’s signature use of 
quotation and parody, “[i]t is difficult to imagine that Ulysses, had it been 
written and published under [the current copyright] regime, would have made 
nearly as extensive use of its protected source texts or of the unpublished 
writings . . . of others.”219  Many other works of modernism likewise might 
have been different had they been created in an intellectual-property climate 
“that recognizes the smallest reuse of material as a potential infringement and 
reduces fair use to the quotation of brief passages for review.”220 
                                                                                                                            
 216. In March 1918, Ulysses began appearing serially in issues of the Little Review, for which 
Pound served as foreign editor.  GEORGE BORNSTEIN, MATERIAL MODERNISM: THE POLITICS OF 
THE PAGE 87 (2001). 
 217. See DAVID PERKINS, A HISTORY OF MODERN POETRY: FROM THE 1890S TO THE HIGH 
MODERNIST MODE 473–79 (1976) (noting the qualities of allusion, juxtaposition, and learned 
reference in the pre-1922 writings of Pound, T.S. Eliot, and James Joyce). 
 218. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE 
L.J. 1, 8 (2002) (“[T]he field of intellectual property . . . today . . . is enjoying unprecedented 
growth, both in importance and scope.”).  Today, the modernist practices of quotation, adaptation, 
and paraphrase might be deemed to run afoul of the author’s exclusive rights to reproduce copies of the 
work and to make derivative works.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(2) (2006); Salinger v. Random 
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97–100 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that a biographer’s quotation and close 
paraphrase of an author’s unpublished letters were not fair use, and directing issuance of a preliminary 
injunction).  For an interesting “thought experiment” concluding that James Joyce’s techniques of 
quotation and parody would be much harder to practice in today’s intellectual-property climate, 
see SAINT-AMOUR, supra note 114, at 193–98. 
 219. SAINT-AMOUR, supra note 114, at 197. 
 220. Id.  Saint-Amour refers here as much to the protective attitudes of many current copyright 
owners as to the actual legal standards created by legislatures and courts.  For a discussion of the aggressive-
ness of the current holders of modernist copyrights, see infra notes 246–266 and accompanying text. 
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The more permissive and less propertized climate in which Pound and 
other modernists produced their richly allusive and collagist experiments was 
an enabling condition that those writers evidently were able to take for 
granted.221  They did not record any gratitude for copyright laws that left intact 
a public domain brimming with raw materials that the individual talent could 
use without cost to situate itself in relation to tradition.222  Although Pound 
in his New Age article complained about the impact on contemporary writers 
of unequal competition with public-domain authors, he does not seem to 
have considered the real cost savings that he and his fellow writers enjoyed by 
being able to borrow freely from those same authors.223  It could be argued that 
any competitive disadvantage that modernist writers experienced with respect 
to earlier literary periods was at least mitigated by modernists’ ability to mine 
those same periods for literary material without having to contend with 
permissions fees, transaction costs, or threats of litigation.  The cost savings 
that allowed publishers to issue Shakespeare more cheaply than T.S. Eliot 
arose from the same free public resource that permitted Eliot in The Waste Land 
to quote from and adapt Shakespeare without having to acquire a license224—
although this does not alter the fact that in 1922 a publisher of Shakespeare’s 
sonnets could presumably undersell a publisher of The Waste Land.225 
In drafting his copyright statute, Pound was more concerned with inequities 
in the marketplace than with the economics of the creative process.226  Problems 
of distribution and compensation, not the scene of writing, captured his 
imagination as a volunteer legislator.  Accordingly, Pound does not treat 
authorial labor as something that needs to be incentivized by enhanced 
                                                                                                                            
 221. See Paul K. Saint-Amour, Book Review, 12 MODERNISM/MODERNITY 511, 511 (2005) 
(reviewing LANDES & POSNER, supra note 208) (describing modernist writing under the present 
intellectual-property laws as “[t]hat which is still propertized”). 
 222. I allude to T.S. Eliot’s famous discussion of contemporary authors’ relationship to literary 
tradition.  See T.S. ELIOT, Tradition and the Individual Talent (1919), in SELECTED PROSE OF T.S. 
ELIOT 37–44 (Frank Kermode ed., 1975). 
 223. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 208, at 52 (“[T]he absence of copyright protection 
is, paradoxical as this may seem, a benefit to authors as well as a cost to them.  It reduces the cost 
of writing by enabling an author to copy freely from his predecessors.”). 
 224. Eliot quotes from or echoes Shakespeare at numerous points in The Waste Land.  See, 
e.g., T.S. ELIOT, The Waste Land, in COLLECTED POEMS, supra note 213, l.48, at 54, ll. 77–78, 
125, 128 at 56–57, l. 172, at 59, ll. 191–92, at 60, l. 257, at 62. 
 225. Of course, Shakespeare, too, took much of his material for free from unprotected sources.  
See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 208, at 58–60. 
 226. Pound worried to some degree that depriving authors of remuneration for their writings 
might harm ex ante incentives to create.  See Pound, supra note 8, at 208–09 (asserting that “[the fact 
that dead authors’ public-domain works undersell living authors’ copyrighted works] is to the disadvantage 
of . . . literary production”).  On balance, however, Pound was more interested in mechanisms for 
disseminating works already created. 
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copyright protection.  Perpetual copyright can provide an income stream and 
make for a fairer marketplace, but he does not offer his eternal monopoly as 
an ex ante stimulus to literary production.  Similarly, by requiring publishers 
who take advantage of compulsory licenses to make royalty payments, he simply 
acknowledges the right of authors and their heirs to ex post remuneration.  
Pound’s legislative energies were stirred by the prospect of unchecked dissemi-
nation of books and art, not by economic stimulus packages for creators.  His 
theory of copyright is therefore essentially a consumer- or demand-side theory, 
though he does not ignore the plight of pirated writers. 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF HEIRS AND LONG COPYRIGHTS 
Except in his poetic practice, Pound did not overtly acknowledge mod-
ernism’s dependence on the literary public domain.227  Nevertheless, in his 
copyright statute he shows a keen awareness of the problems that a maximalist 
copyright regime can create.  After declaring that copyrights should be perpet-
ual, he immediately turns to what he candidly refers to as the “dangers 
[that] should be guarded against” in such a system of strong protection.228  
Chief among these dangers are authors and heirs who, now possessed of an 
everlasting copyright, might “play dog in the manger”229 or exercise their power 
to “prevent the publication of [the authors’] works”230 by perversely interfering 
with the affordable use and dissemination of previously published works.231  
Given his grant of an eternal copyright, Pound had good reason to worry that 
heirs might let an author’s works fall out of print or somehow stand in the 
way of cheap reprints and translations, thus impeding communication among 
                                                                                                                            
 227. Pound often paid tribute, however, to the “cultural heritage,” which he defined as “the 
whole aggregate of human inventions, ameliorations of seed, of agricultural and mechanical 
process belonging to no one man, and to no group, escaping the possibilities of any definition of 
patents under any possible system of patent rights . . . .”  EZRA POUND, The Individual in His 
Milieu: A Study of Relations and Gesell (1935), in SELECTED PROSE, supra note 77, at 272, 275. 
 228. Pound, supra note 8, at 208. 
 229. Id. at 209. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See id.  Pound’s concern about obstructive heirs contrasts sharply with William Wordsworth’s 
confidence that 
 as long as the [copyright] privilege remained in the hands of the author’s children or 
descendants, who can doubt that they would be peculiarly prompted to extend the 
circulation of his works, not merely for their own pecuniary advantage, but out of respect 
or reverence for his memory, and to fulfil [sic] what could not but be presumed to be his 
wish?   
Letter From William Wordsworth to the Editor of the Kendal Mercury (Apr. 12, 1838), in 3 THE 
PROSE WORKS OF WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, supra note 135, at 309–10. 
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nations.  The subsequent history of modernist writing and scholarship has 
shown that Pound’s fears were justified. 
A. Pound’s Prescience 
In 1918 when Pound proposed aggressive liability rules that would 
prevent the misuse of a perpetual property right, the actual term of copyright 
in the United States was a total of fifty-six years from the date of publication; 
in Britain, the term was the author’s life plus fifty years.232  Although these 
terms have since grown dramatically,233 even in 1918 Pound perceived that a 
lengthy copyright term could deliver a mischievous power into the hands of 
authors’ heirs, to the detriment of the public interest.  Like the current copyright 
regime, Pound’s statute seeks to assure authors’ descendants of an income 
stream, but, unlike current laws, his statute renders those descendants 
virtually powerless to interfere with later publications and translations of authors’ 
works if the compulsory license provision is triggered.234  In this respect, Pound 
showed himself to be remarkably prescient, for in the past few decades the 
                                                                                                                            
 232. See Copyright Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 3 (Eng.) (providing for a copyright 
term of the author’s life plus fifty years); Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 
(providing for copyright protection for 28 years from the date of first publication, renewable for 
another 28 years upon application to the Copyright Office). 
 233. Copyright terms in the United States and the United Kingdom currently endure for 
the author’s life plus seventy years.  17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006); Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act, 1988, c. 48, § 12(2). 
 234. For example, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act increased existing and 
future copyright terms by twenty years in the United States, but included virtually no counterbalancing 
limitations on copyright owner’s exclusive rights.  Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298 sec. 102(b), § 302 and sec. 102(d), § 304, 112 Stat. 2827, 2827–28 
(amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 304 (2006)).  (The Sonny Bono Act did include a limited 
exception for library and archival uses of works during the last twenty years of their copyright 
terms.  Act of Oct. 27, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, sec. 104, § 108, 112 Stat. 2827, 2829 (codified 
at 17 U.S.C. § 108(h) (2006)).)  In enacting this legislation, Congress had authors’ heirs specifically in 
mind.  See 141 CONG. REC. 6,553 (1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (contending that copyright 
duration under the 1976 Copyright Act as originally enacted did not adequately secure “the right 
to profit from licensing one’s work during one’s lifetime and to take pride and comfort in knowing 
that one’s children—and perhaps their children—might also benefit from one’s posthumous 
popularity”); 144 CONG. REC. S12,377 (1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Among the main 
developments [compelling reconsideration of the 1976 Act’s original term of protection] is the 
effect of demographic trends, such as increasing longevity and the trend toward rearing children 
later in life, on the effectiveness of the life-plus-fifty term to provide adequate protection for 
American creators and their heirs.”); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206–08 & n.15 
(2003) (citing the testimony of artists concerning the needs of their heirs as a rational basis for 
Congress’s increasing copyright terms in the Sonny Bono Act).  Pleas for the welfare of heirs have 
long been a staple of arguments favoring copyright term extensions.  See, e.g., WOODMANSEE, supra 
note 135, at 145–47 (1994) (summarizing Wordsworth’s efforts in the first half of the 19th century to 
persuade British legislators to extend the copyright term for the economic benefit of authors and 
their descendants). 
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actions and attitudes of the heirs of a number of major modernist authors 
have become an acute problem for scholars and others who wish to make use 
of those authors’ works. 
It should be said at the outset that the specific “dangers”235 envisaged by 
Pound—absence of translations and reprints of previously published works—
have not occurred, for the most part.  Although many important modernist 
works are still in copyright,236 they tend to be kept in print, thanks in no 
small part to the demand created by college students who are required to read 
these texts in literature courses.237  (It can be argued, however, that these 
copyrighted texts are sold at higher prices than Pound would have approved.238)  
But other writings by modernists have not fared so well.  Not infrequently, 
heirs and estates have refused to allow scholars to quote from or reproduce 
unpublished manuscripts, letters, diaries, and other important documents 
(even though many of those documents exist in archives that are accessible 
to the public).  Copyright owners have also prevented the public from 
experiencing new derivative works and creative performances based on estab-
lished modernist masterworks.  Although Pound did not discuss the intersection 
of intellectual property and unpublished writings, it is reasonable to think 
that he would have been troubled by copyright impediments to the dissemi-
nation of at least certain categories of unpublished material.  When early in 
his career he was given access to the unpublished notebooks of the recently 
                                                                                                                            
 235. Pound, supra note 8, at 208–09. 
 236. For a discussion of the copyright status of modernist works, see Spoo, supra note 13, at 
660–63 & n.158. 
 237. Many scholars have noted the large market for literary modernism in the university 
classroom.  See, e.g., LEONARD DIEPEVEEN, THE DIFFICULTIES OF MODERNISM 226 (2003) (“[The 
university] established a stable—and, after World War II, a large—readership [of modernist texts].  
With classes being established in literary modernism, annual sales of Joyce’s Ulysses would easily 
outpace the sales of the novel in its first ten years.”); Mark S. Morrison, Publishing, in A COMPANION 
TO MODERNIST LITERATURE AND CULTURE 133, 142 (David Bradshaw & Kevin J.H. Dettmar 
eds., 2006) (“The entrance of modernism into the university classroom . . . paved the way for 
modernist works such as Ulysses, or The Great Gatsby, or even the poetry of T.S. Eliot to reach 
new audiences—the size of which would have astounded the original small press and little 
magazine publishers of modernism.”); Lawrence S. Rainey, Canon, Gender, and Text: The Case of 
H.D., in REPRESENTING MODERNIST TEXTS: EDITING AS INTERPRETATION 99, 104 (George 
Bornstein ed., 1991) (discussing the modernist poet H.D. (Hilda Doolittle) and “the massive 
transmission of [her] writings to a large new public commanded by the professoriate and the 
agency of university curricula”). 
 238. See, e.g., Warwick Gould, Predators and Editors: Yeats in the Pre- and Post-Copyright Era, 
in 8 OFFICE FOR HUMANITIES COMMC’N, TEXTUAL MONOPOLIES: LITERARY COPYRIGHT AND 
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 69, 74–80 (Patrick Parrinder & Warren Chernaik eds., 1997) (documenting 
the increased sales of inexpensive editions of W.B. Yeats’s poems following the expiration of 
Yeats’s U.K. copyrights in 1990). 
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deceased Oriental scholar Ernest Fenollosa,239 he dedicated himself to mining 
these documents for Noh dramas, poetry, and other works, which he dutifully 
edited and saw into print over the course of several years.240  Later in his 
career, Pound was among the first modernists to authorize and encourage the 
publication of his own unpublished letters.241 
Although barriers erected by heirs and estates to the use of unpublished 
materials are not the precise dangers of which Pound warned in his copyright 
proposal, they constitute comparable obstacles to understanding the 
achievements of modernist writers.  The spirit of Pound’s copyright statute, 
and of his own practice as editor of important unpublished materials, favors 
dissemination of writings by and about Joyce, Eliot, Beckett, and other major 
writers, many of whom were expatriates who, like Henry James, sought to 
communicate the significance of one culture to other cultures.  As these authors 
have long since died, scholarship has become the chief vehicle for carrying on 
their Jamesian “labour of translation”242—the project of “making it possible 
for individuals to meet across national borders.”243  Yet scholars have often 
met with the “dog in the manger”244 attitudes that Pound worried might be 
encouraged by long copyrights.  His insistence that “the heirs of an author 
should be powerless to prevent the publication of his works”245 suggests a 
broad rejection of interference by later copyright owners, whatever the rea-
sons those owners might have for interfering. 
It has not been uncommon for heirs and estates to use their ownership 
of copyrights to suppress or control scholarship.  For many years, Valerie 
Eliot, the widow of T.S. Eliot, has vigilantly protected the memory and the 
unpublished letters and papers of her famous husband.246  As her former 
research assistant noted in 2005, “[Mrs. Eliot] continues to guard his letters, 
restricts access to the Eliot papers at universities and refuses permission to 
                                                                                                                            
 239. See CARPENTER, supra note 7, at 219–20.  Because Pound received these notebooks 
only a few years after Fenollosa’s death in 1908, see id. at 219, the notebooks were still protected 
by copyright.  It should be noted that Pound was encouraged by Fenollosa’s widow to make use of 
the notebooks, id. at 220, so there was no question of opposition by a copyright owner. 
 240. See id. at 222–23, 237, 265–69, 271–73, 307 (discussing Pound’s editing and publication of 
Noh dramas, essays, and poems culled from Fenollosa’s notebooks). 
 241. THE SELECTED LETTERS OF EZRA POUND, 1907–1941 (D.D. Paige ed., New Directions 
1971) (1950).  The volume contains over 300 letters by Pound.  Its editor, D.D. Paige, noted that Pound 
had “generously given the editor access” to copies of his letters, and thanked “Mr. and Mrs. Pound” for 
assisting with the volume.  Id. at xxiv–xxv. 
 242. Pound, supra note 142, at 144. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Pound, supra note 8, at 208–09. 
 245. Id. at 209. 
 246. Karen Christensen, Dear Mrs Eliot . . . , GUARDIAN, Jan. 29, 2005, at 4, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2005/jan/29/classics.thomasstearnseliot. 
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quote his work.  Scholars are tremulous in dealing with the Eliot estate.”247  
Ian Hamilton, a noted literary biographer, wrote in 2000, 
Perhaps the most impregnable estate today is that of T S Eliot.  Eliot 
has been dead for more than 30 years, but still there is no sign of any 
authorised biography.  There have been unauthorised Lives—and good 
ones, too—by Peter Ackroyd and Lyndall Gordon, but neither of these 
writers enjoyed much assistance from the Eliot Estate: that is to say, 
from Valerie Eliot, the poet’s fiercely loyal widow.  Valerie holds all 
the copyrights; if Eliot scholars want to print quotations from the poet’s 
work, they have to go through her—and this, by all accounts, is not at 
all straightforward.  If Valerie does not like a critic’s line, she may well 
feel disinclined to grant permissions.  In some cases, her refusal could 
scupper a scholar’s entire project.248 
Although Mrs. Eliot has issued some of Eliot’s unpublished writings249 and has 
approved the publication of others,250 her control over his estate since his death 
in 1965 has severely hampered a full understanding of Eliot’s life and career. 
The Eliot estate is not alone in its controlling attitude.  The niece of the 
poet Marianne Moore “has been unusually strict with permissions” for academic 
and biographical uses.251  Restrictions imposed by the Moore estate on quotations 
                                                                                                                            
 247. Id.  Twenty years ago, a single volume of Eliot’s letters was published, covering the early 
part of his career up to 1922.  See 1 THE LETTERS OF T.S. ELIOT, 1898–1922 (Valerie Eliot ed., 
1988).  Since that time, Mrs. Eliot, who presides over the letters project, has published no further 
volumes, even though hundreds or perhaps thousands of letters remain unpublished—several 
volumes worth, according to her former assistant.  Christensen, supra note 246, at 4.  “The Eliot 
letters still linger in [Mrs. Eliot’s] flat in Kensington, and it’s said that it is unlikely that more will 
be published during Valerie Eliot’s lifetime . . . .”  Id. 
 248. Ian Hamilton, Keepers of the Flame, NEW STATESMAN, May 29, 2000, at 45, 46; see also 
Matthew Rimmer, Bloomsday: Copyright Estates and Cultural Festivals, 2 SCRIPT-ED: J.L. TECH. & 
SOC’Y 345, 368–69 (2005), available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol2-3/bloomsday.pdf, 
(describing the Eliot estate’s refusal to allow an unauthorized biographer to quote from either published 
or unpublished writings by Eliot). 
 249. See, e.g., T.S. ELIOT, THE WASTE LAND: A FACSIMILE AND TRANSCRIPT OF THE 
ORIGINAL DRAFTS INCLUDING THE ANNOTATIONS OF EZRA POUND (Valerie Eliot ed., 1971). 
 250. See, e.g., T.S. ELIOT, INVENTIONS OF THE MARCH HARE: POEMS, 1909–1917 
(Christopher Ricks ed., 1996) (containing unpublished early poems by Eliot). 
 251. D.T. Max, The Injustice Collector: Is James Joyce’s Grandson Suppressing Scholarship?, 
NEW YORKER, June 19, 2006, at 34, 36; see also id. (“[I]n 1989, [Moore’s niece] demanded that a 
biographer remove all quotations from the poet’s unpublished letters.”).  A webpage for a Yale 
University online Open Course on modern poetry states, “At the request of the Literary Estate of 
Marianne Moore, the poetry of Marianne Moore is not included in Open Yale Courses.”  Lecture 
17, Marianne Moore, Open Yale Courses, http://oyc.yale.edu/english/modern-poetry/content/sessions/ 
lecture17.html (last visited June 6, 2009).  While quotations from other poets studied in this Open 
Course are included in web-published transcripts of the lectures, quotations from Moore’s poems 
are omitted and referred to by line numbers only.  See Langdon Hammer, Modern Poetry: Lecture 17 
Transcript (Apr. 2, 2007), http://oyc.yale.edu/english/modern-poetry/content/transcripts/engl310_ 
17a_040207_final.html. 
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and the high permissions fees demanded by Moore’s publishers have discouraged 
scholarly work on the poet.252  The estate of Samuel Beckett, overseen by his 
nephew, notoriously holds an “iron grip on the playwright’s works,” and has 
used legal threats to shut down disapproved performances and ensure that 
producers and directors show undeviating fidelity to what the estate believes 
are Beckett’s intentions.253   
The Beckett estate combats what it views as contaminations of the author’s 
intentions and legacy, a practice not limited to the heirs of modernist authors.254  
But in doing so, it has chilled the communication of new interpretations of 
works that have attained a prominent and sometimes controversial status in 
our culture.255  One commentator has observed that Beckett’s estate “is setting 
                                                                                                                            
 252. E-mail From Patricia Willis, Former Curator, Collection of Am. Literature, Beinecke 
Library, Yale Univ., to Robert Spoo (Mar. 20, 2008, 3:25 p.m. EST) (on file with author). 
 253. Barbara McMahon, Beckett Estate Fails to Stop Women Waiting for Godot, GUARDIAN 
(London), Feb. 4, 2006, at 19, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/feb/04/arts.italy; see also 
Rimmer, supra note 248, at 373 (describing the Beckett estate’s legal threats against an Australian 
production of a Beckett play that used unauthorized music).  In 2006, the estate tried and failed to 
persuade an Italian court to enjoin an otherwise licensed performance of Waiting for Godot after the 
estate learned that the two lead male roles were to be played by women.  See McMahon, supra, at 19; see 
also Katie Charles, Chin Up: How Fiona Shaw Got Over Her Aversion to Beckett’s Happy Days, N.Y. 
MAG., Dec. 30, 2007, available at http://nymag.com/arts/theater/features/42365 (“[T]he Beckett estate 
adheres to a strict policy of gender appropriateness: Male roles must be played by men, and female roles 
by women.”).  In 1994, the “[f]amously proprietary” estate shut down a London performance of Beckett’s 
Footfalls because the director had cut five lines of text and permitted an actress to move about the stage 
in a manner not indicated by the stage directions.  Id.  A few years earlier, legal threats by the estate 
forced a Northwestern University graduate student to remove certain visual experiments from her 
production of Beckett’s Endgame; the estate strongly disapproved of the experiments, even though the 
text of the play was not altered.  Casey Newton, Beckett’s Estate Brings Down Curtain on ‘Endgame’ Role, 
DAILY NW., May 5, 2000, http://media.www.dailynorthwestern.com/media/storage/paper853/news/ 
2000/05/05/Campus/Becketts.Estate.Brings.Down.Curtain.On.endgame.Role-1904358.shtml. 
 254. The owners of Margaret Mitchell’s copyrights have also insisted on strict fidelity to her 
presumed intentions.  In 2001, when the Mitchell trusts learned that an unauthorized novel was 
to be published that made use of plotlines, characters, and settings from Mitchell’s Gone With the 
Wind, they sought and temporarily obtained injunctive relief.  See SunTrust Bank v. Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).  The enjoined work, entitled The Wind Done Gone, 
was a retelling of Mitchell’s famous 1936 novel from the point of view of a mixed-race slave.  Its 
author, Alice Randall, sought “to expose the erasure of black subjectivity in Gone with [sic] the 
Wind, to combat its racial stereotypes, and to impugn its nostalgic, romantic vision of the Old 
South.”  Rubenfeld, supra note 218, at 9; see also id. at 8–9 (discussing The Wind Done Gone and 
the litigation over it); SAINT-AMOUR, supra note 114, at 207–18 (same).  The Mitchell trusts permit 
sequels to Gone With the Wind only when certain “ground rules” are observed, including the requirement 
that no “interracial or homosexual sex” be depicted and that Scarlett O’Hara not die.  Id. at 210.  The Wind 
Done Gone violated all these taboos.  Id.  Mitchell, though contemporaneous with modernist writers, is not 
regarded as one herself, but the latter-day holders of her copyrights have shown an aggressiveness in 
safeguarding her authorial reputation similar to that of the estates of Joyce, Eliot, and Beckett. 
 255. See ANTHONY CRONIN, SAMUEL BECKETT: THE LAST MODERNIST 449 (1999) (discussing 
Beckett’s “celebrity as a controversial playwright”); Carol Gelderman, Samuel Beckett, in 1 MCGRAW-
HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD DRAMA 284, 285 (Stanley Hochman ed., 2d ed. 1984) (“[T]he Paris 
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the stage for his great works to become so conventional—by order of his 
voice from beyond the grave—that they are lost on future generations.”256  
Long copyright terms allow Beckett’s heirs to prevent enterprising directors 
and other creative users of his plays from engaging in what Pound, referring 
to the efforts of Henry James, called the “labour of translation”257: the 
enterprise of making earlier works intelligible and meaningful to other times 
and other readers.  Pound’s capacious sense of “translation” is significant and 
instructive in this context.  His literal desire to increase the quantum of 
translated works by means of compulsory licenses was an extension of his 
broader commitment to the Jamesian labor of translation by which different 
nations and cultures, and by implication different generations, could come to 
“meet across . . . borders.”258  The obstructionist behavior of the Beckett estate 
is inconsistent with Pound’s cultural imperative to maximize communication 
through translation, both in the specific publishing sense and in the larger 
Jamesian sense. 
Probably the most fiercely vigilant and obstructive modernist estate in 
recent years has been that of James Joyce.  The Joyce estate, which is controlled 
chiefly by the Irish author’s grandson, Stephen James Joyce, has been described as 
“muffling a whole field of study with a combination of litigation and bravado.”259  
In 1988, Mr. Joyce insisted that an epilogue to a biography of Joyce’s wife, 
which discussed Joyce’s mentally disturbed daughter, be deleted from a book 
already in press, and that the biographer agree that she and her descendants 
would never publish the omitted material.260  Mr. Joyce has sued or threatened 
to sue various users of Joyce’s works, including: the editor of an unauthorized 
edition of Ulysses; a university press that issued an anthology containing 
excerpts of Joyce’s writings; and the National Library of Ireland, which had 
planned to display newly acquired Ulysses manuscripts during a Joyce celebration 
                                                                                                                            
production of Waiting for Godot (1953) immediately established [Beckett] as one of the most controversial 
dramatists of his time and brought the so-called theatre of the absurd to popular attention.”). 
 256. News Blog, Waiting for the Estate of Samuel Beckett, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., June 29, 2006, 
http://chronicle.com/news/article/645/waiting-for-the-estate-of-samuel-beckett. 
 257. Pound, supra note 142, at 144. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Max, supra note 251, at 37. 
 260. Id. at 34.  With the date of publication approaching, the biographer, Brenda Maddox, and her 
publisher grew increasingly worried as Stephen Joyce continued to withhold permission for quotations from 
Joyce material used throughout the text of the biography.  “Maddox . . . agreed to drop [the epilogue] as 
barter for retaining all quoted material.”  James Woodall, My Tussle With James Joyce’s Censor: Nixing the 
Portals of Discovery, MORE INTELLIGENT LIFE, Oct. 15, 2008, http://www.moreintelligentlife.com/story/my-
tussle-with-james-joyce039s-censor. 
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in 2004.261  The estate has refused permission for, or otherwise made difficult 
or impossible, numerous scholarly and creative projects—notably, an 
electronic multimedia version of Ulysses that an academic had spent years 
developing.262  Because Mr. Joyce “rejects nearly every request to quote from 
unpublished letters,” some 1,500 Joyce letters remain available only in 
libraries and archives around the world.263  Stephen Joyce claims that he is 
“‘only protecting and preserving the purity of [his] grandfather’s work [and] 
what remains of the much abused privacy of the Joyce family.’”264  The Joyces’ 
private life is “‘no one’s fucking business,’” he has remarked, adding that 
academics are like “‘rats and lice—they should be exterminated!’”265  The 
Joyce estate’s obstructionism is profoundly at odds with the spirit of Ezra 
Pound’s belief that “the heirs of an author should be powerless to prevent the 
publication of his works . . . .”266 
                                                                                                                            
 261. Max, supra note 251, at 35.  For a discussion of lawsuits brought by the Joyce estate, see 
Robert Spoo, Three Myths for Aging Copyrights: Tithonus, Dorian Gray, Ulysses, in 6 JOYCE STUDIES 
2004, at 15–21 (Luca Crispi & Catherine Fahy eds., 2004). 
 262. Max, supra note 251, at 37; see also Rimmer, supra note 248, at 364–71, 374–76 (discussing 
the Joyce estate’s efforts to block various scholarly, creative, and popular uses of Joyce’s writings); Robert 
Spoo, Copyrights and “Design-Around” Scholarship, 44 JAMES JOYCE Q. 563, 567–68 (2007) (describing 
scholarly projects that have been affected by the attitudes of the Joyce estate); Spoo, supra note 261, at 
13–15 (describing various projects that the Joyce estate has discouraged or attempted to discourage). 
 263. Max, supra note 251, at 35, 37. 
 264. Id. at 35–36. 
 265. Id. at 36. 
 266. Pound, supra note 8, at 209.  In recent years, however, scholars have made some inroads into 
the estate’s flat prohibition on use of protected unpublished materials.  In 2006, Professor Carol Loeb 
Shloss of Stanford University’s English Department, who had been bullied by Mr. Joyce, decided to turn 
the tables and file a lawsuit against the Joyce estate.  The background of Shloss’s lawsuit is recounted in 
Max, supra note 251, at 40–43.  See also generally Robert Spoo, Archival Foreclosure: A Scholar’s Lawsuit 
Against the Estate of James Joyce, 71 AM. ARCHIVIST 544–51 (2008) (discussing in detail the events of 
the lawsuit).  Shloss had spent years researching a biography of Joyce’s talented and troubled daughter, 
Lucia, and at last published it in 2003, see CAROL LOEB SHLOSS, LUCIA JOYCE: TO DANCE IN THE 
WAKE (2003), but not before she and her publisher deleted many quotations from unpublished material 
after receiving multiple threats from Mr. Joyce.  When Shloss informed the estate that she intended to 
create a website that would contain the deleted quotations placed within a scholarly context, the Estate 
forbade the project as unauthorized and infringing.  Having engaged legal counsel (disclosure: I have 
served as co-counsel to Shloss in her lawsuit against the Joyce estate, along with the Stanford Center for 
Internet & Society and Fair Use Project and other counsel), Shloss filed an action against the 
estate in a California federal court, seeking a declaration that her proposed website made fair use of the 
copyrighted materials and that the estate’s actions with respect to her and other scholars over the years 
constituted copyright misuse.  See generally Amended Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and 
Injunctive Relief, Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2006) (No. CV 06-3718), 
available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/Amended+Complaint+Final%5B1%5D.doc.  After 
losing its motion to dismiss, see Shloss v. Sweeney, 515 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2007), the 
Joyce estate agreed to a settlement whereby Shloss was able to place on her website all of the quoted 
material she had planned to include, and to make additional uses of the material that she had not 
sought in her complaint.  The nonconfidential Settlement Agreement is available online.  See 
Settlement Agreement, Civil Actions CV 06-3718 JW HRL & C07 00517 MEJ, available at 
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Not all heirs and estates of modernist authors have been so difficult.  
The estate of W.B. Yeats, overseen until recently by the poet’s children, has 
been generous in granting permissions and making unpublished materials 
available to scholars and libraries.267  The Ezra Pound Literary Property Trust, 
administered by New Directions Publishing Corporation in collaboration 
with the poet’s son and daughter, has given permission for many scholarly 
projects in the United States and abroad, including books reproducing Pound’s 
unpublished letters and manuscripts.268  In this respect, Pound’s children and 
the trust that administers his literary property have acted in the spirit of 
Pound’s own commitment to unrestrained dissemination of authors’ writings. 
Pound’s fear that authors or heirs would “play dog in the manger”269 with 
the copyrights they control, or exercise a broad power to “prevent” publica-
tion,270 has been realized in the case of Joyce, Eliot, Beckett, and other 
modernist authors.  The root of the problem is plain.  Extremely long copyrights 
have placed monopoly control in the hands of heirs and transferees who are 
remote historically, and sometimes temperamentally, from the authors whose 
rights they administer and from the origins of the writings they jealously 
protect.  Genetic connection is no guarantee of literary sensitivity or historical 
responsibility.  For every Pound estate that strives to foster understanding of an 
author, there is a Joyce estate that places family privacy or reputational purity 
above all other considerations.  Lengthy copyrights allow mere rightholders to 
become privileged and sometimes arbitrary custodians of culture.  The power 
to dictate the shape of scholarship and biography can be especially dangerous 
when an author has become as important, and even iconic, as some of the 
modernist writers.  Pound foresaw this possibility that heirs would block the 
progress of learning, and thus crafted broad compulsory-license provisions to rein 
in the potential abuse of copyrights. 
                                                                                                                            
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/Shloss+Settlement+Agreement.pdf (last visited June 5, 2009).  
The court also issued an order declaring that Shloss was the “prevailing party” under the copyright 
statute and was entitled to her costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.  See Shloss, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 1086. 
 267. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 216, at 42 (noting that “not all copyright holders for other 
poets have been as cooperative or as scrupulous as the Yeats estate for works still under restriction”); see 
also Bernard Adams, Michael Yeats, INDEP. (London), Jan. 10, 2007, at 32 (describing, in an obituary of 
Yeats’s son Michael, the courtesy and generosity with which Michael and his sister responded to 
scholarly inquiries). 
 268. Scores of books and articles attest to the cooperation of the Pound Trust and its agents.  
See, e.g., LAWRENCE S. RAINEY, EZRA POUND AND THE MONUMENT OF CULTURE: TEXT, 
HISTORY, AND THE MALATESTA CANTOS at xiv (1991) (“I am also grateful to New Directions 
Publishing Corporation, agents for the Trustees of the Ezra Pound Literary Property Trust, for 
permission to quote from published and unpublished materials by Ezra Pound . . . .”). 
 269. Pound, supra note 8, at 209. 
 270. Id. at 208–09. 
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B. Recent Proposals for Balancing Long Copyrights With the Needs  
of the Public 
Pound’s compulsory-license scheme was fueled by a simple intuition: 
Heirs (and even authors) might not be the best stewards of literary legacies.  
If such individuals proved to be inadequate to the task of keeping reprints and 
translations in circulation, compulsory licenses would allow that role to be shared 
by anyone who chose to spend the time and resources to ensure dissemination 
of works.  Essentially, this was a mechanism for placing literary property in 
the hands of those who would make the highest and best use of it.  Pound’s 
compulsory licenses, once they were triggered by the abdication of copyright 
owners, would transfer reprint and translation rights to those more motivated to 
exercise them, with the sole requirement that they make fixed royalty payments 
to the copyright owners. 
This scheme would have created a sort of paying public domain, where 
publishers and translators with the requisite funds, energy, and insight could 
assume control of literary resources.  The ordinary public domain as we know 
it today also calls forth such volunteers, but without the necessity of royalty 
payments.271  Pound’s paying public domain would have the signal advantage 
of permitting unauthorized uses, not when copyrights at long last expire (they 
don’t under his scheme), but rather when copyright owners threaten market 
failure by neglecting authors’ works or by guarding those works too zealously.  
Transposed to the present day and its elastic conception of publication 
(which for many includes the countless forms of self-publishing on the 
Internet),272 Pound’s scheme might be effective in breaking some of the impasses 
encountered by scholars.273 
                                                                                                                            
 271. The same conclusion has been suggested in the idiom of law and economics.  See, e.g., 
Dennis S. Karjala, Congestion Externalities and Extended Copyright Protection, 94 GEO. L.J. 1065, 
1079 (2006) (“[A] belief that the original creator (or his transferee) can best manage the work in 
the public interest runs strongly contrary to our long-standing and fundamental reliance on free 
markets to allocate resources to the production and distribution of goods.”); Mark A. Lemley, Ex 
Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 141–48 (2004) 
(discussing the market wisdom of granting exclusive rights in intellectual property and the effects 
of such grants on the availability and cost of information). 
 272. See generally Caryn S. Wesner-Early, Self-Publishing Online, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIBRARY 
AND INFORMATION SCIENCE 2589–94 (Miriam A. Drake ed., 2d ed. 2003) (discussing definitions of 
self-publishing in the online context). 
 273. For example, if online self-publication qualified as “publishing” under Pound’s statute, the 
academic scholar whose electronic multimedia version of Ulysses was effectively vetoed by the Joyce 
estate could, under Pound’s scheme, have gone forward with launching his project on the Internet, with 
the sole obligation of paying the estate an ex post royalty on revenues earned from the project.  See 
supra note 262 and accompanying text for reference to the vetoed electronic version of Ulysses. 
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In addition to recalling nineteenth-century free-trade royalty schemes, 
Pound’s statute anticipates recent academic and legislative proposals for bal-
ancing the effects of long copyrights with the needs of the public.  These 
proposals are often different from Pound’s scheme in detail and scope, but 
they spring from the same sense of urgency to ensure that expansive intellectual-
property rights do not interfere with the availability of cultural products.  For 
example, William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner have advocated a system 
of indefinitely renewable copyright whereby owners, in order to maintain their 
property rights, would be required to renew copyright registrations every ten 
years or so by filing some paperwork and paying a fee.274  Because only those 
with financial or other incentives for maintaining copyrights would take the 
trouble to renew, “[m]ore works will be in the public domain, thus minimizing 
access, transaction, and administrative costs, while those few copyrights that 
retain their value will remain in copyright protection indefinitely . . . .”275  
Like Pound’s statute, this scheme gives copyright owners an opportunity to 
maintain their rights perpetually, but also allows works to become freely 
available for use by the public if owners abdicate their stewardship. 
Similarly, Lawrence Lessig has proposed a system whereby owners would 
have to renew their copyrights every five years in order to maintain the prop-
erty right.276  If the current “‘no effort’ monopoly handout” were replaced with 
a regime in which owners have the burden of re-registering copyrights, orphan 
works and other abandoned or underexploited products would lose copyright 
protection and become available to the public sooner rather than later.277  In 
recent years, various bills, entitled the Public Domain Enhancement Act, have 
been introduced in Congress to amend the Copyright Act by requiring a 
maintenance fee, or tax, of one dollar to be paid fifty years after the publication 
of a work and “every 10 years thereafter until the end of the copyright term.”278  
Under these proposals, if the fee is not paid within a certain period, the work 
loses its copyright and becomes available for anyone to use.279  The purpose of 
these proposals is, in part, “to establish a mechanism by which abandoned 
                                                                                                                            
 274. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 471, 473, 477 (2003). 
 275. Id. at 518.  Like Pound, Landes and Posner do not let constitutional barriers prevent them 
from urging a potentially infinite copyright.  See id. at 473 (“[W]e are interested in the economics of 
indefinitely renewing the copyright term and express no view on its legality.”). 
 276. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 251–52 (2001) (proposing a five-year copyright 
term, renewable fifteen times). 
 277. Id. at 250. 
 278. H.R. 2408, 109th Cong. § 306 (2005); H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. § 306(a) (2003). 
 279. H.R. 2408, 109th Cong. § 306; H.R. 2601, 108th Cong. § 306(a). 
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American copyrights can enter the public domain.”280  So far, these orphan-
works bills have been referred to the House Judiciary Committee and have 
not emerged.281 
In 1997, Canada succeeded in enacting legislation to address the problem 
of orphan works282—that is, works whose copyright owners cannot be located.283  
These rules permit anyone who has failed to locate a copyright owner after 
making a reasonable search to apply to the government for a nonexclusive 
license to use a published work still under copyright.284  Once a license is issued 
by the Copyright Board of Canada, the licensee may make a wide range of uses, 
with the sole duty of paying a fixed royalty if the copyright owner comes forward 
within a prescribed period.285 
Other recent proposals for altering the copyright law share the spirit, if 
not the precise details, of Pound’s statute.  For example, Jed Rubenfeld has 
urged special remedy rules that he argues would render American copyright 
law more consistent with First Amendment principles.286  In this system, 
copyright owners could continue to seek damages and injunctive relief for 
nontransformative piracies of protected works, but they could bring only an 
action for profit allocation for unauthorized derivative works.287  Because deriva-
tive works require an exercise of what Rubenfeld calls “the freedom of 
imagination,” a sharing of profits is the only remedy for such infringements 
that would not violate the First Amendment.288 
                                                                                                                            
 280. H.R. 2408, 109th Cong. § 2(5) (2005). 
 281. For the referral of H.R. 2601 to committee, see the Library of Congress THOMAS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR02601:@@@X (last visited June 28, 2009).  For the 
referral of H.R. 2408 to committee, see id., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR02408:@@@X 
(last visited June 28, 2009). 
 282. An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1997 S.C., ch. 24, ¶ 50 (Can.). 
 283. Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 77(1) (1985) (Can.). 
 284. Id. § 77(1)–(2). 
 285. Id. § 77(1), (3).  In the United States, legislation has been proposed that would limit the 
damages that may be obtained from an infringer of the copyright in an orphan work if the infringer 
performed a reasonably diligent search for the copyright owner and met other statutory requirements.  
See Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008); Shawn Bentley Orphan Works Act of 
2008, S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008). 
 286. See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 218.  Copyright law arguably interferes with First 
Amendment freedoms by enabling rightholders to obtain court orders regulating speech on the basis of 
its content, and even its viewpoint, inasmuch as speech is deemed infringing under copyright law if it is 
substantially similar to previously copyrighted speech (that is, embodies a certain content), unless the 
challenged speech qualifies as, for example, fair-use criticism (having adopted a certain critical viewpoint).  
Id. at 6–7.  Moreover, copyright law permits prior restraints by authorizing courts to issue pre-publication 
injunctions.  Id. at 6. 
 287. Id. at 48–49, 55–57. 
 288. Id. at 54; see also Alex Kozinski & Christopher Newman, What’s So Fair About Fair Use?, 46 
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 513, 525–26 (1999) (proposing a profit-allocation regime for derivative works as a 
replacement for the current fair-use doctrine). 
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Pound’s compulsory-license rules permitting translations of published 
works to be made and disseminated under certain conditions foreshadow 
Rubenfeld’s goal of encouraging the creation of transformative works that 
increase the quantity of imaginative expression in our society.  Indeed, Pound’s 
statute resembles each of the foregoing proposals in its attempt to come to 
grips with the unintended consequences of long copyrights and the loss to the 
public resulting from under-exploitation of existing works.  Pound saw, as 
Lessig and others would later, that placing copyrights in the hands of single 
owners for lengthy periods of time is a policy fraught with peril.  Heirs and 
other transferees, ever more removed from the moment of authorial creation, 
cannot be depended upon to keep the public interest in view. 
CONCLUSION 
Ezra Pound did something that few advocates of a perpetual copyright 
would dream of doing: He candidly faced and articulated some of the dangers 
to which such a strong property right could give rise.  Wordsworth, another 
great poet-polemicist who believed that copyrights should be everlasting, 
never conceded the harm that concentrating such potent rights in a single 
owner might inflict on the public interest.  Pound was a man whose idées fixes 
about politics and economics ultimately led him into foolish and tragic errors, 
yet on the question of copyright he was open-minded and flexible enough to 
see beyond his own interests as an author and property owner.289  That flexibil-
ity was so great that in proposing an international copyright law he combined 
an extremely strong property rule with extremely aggressive liability rules in a 
scheme that surpassed other historical proposals for amending copyright laws 
by first granting a perpetual monopoly and then radically curtailing its 
potential abuses. 
                                                                                                                            
 289. Although Pound did not pursue his copyright proposal in later years, he avidly followed 
the efforts of others to reform copyright law along somewhat similar lines.  In particular, he admired the 
attempts of Congressman Albert Henry Vestal (1875–1932) in the 1920s and early 1930s to conform 
American copyright law to international standards.  See Ezra Pound, The Exile, EXILE, Spring 1928, at 
102, para. 7, reprinted in 5 POETRY AND PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 4, at 16, 17 (“[T]hose 
impeding Vestal’s reform of copyright dishonesty ought to be suspended in chains.”).  Had they been 
enacted, Vestal’s proposals would, among other things, have extended the copyright term to the author’s 
life plus fifty years, eliminated formalities as a condition of copyright protection, reduced the impact of 
the manufacturing requirements on foreign authors, and permitted the United States to join the Berne 
Convention.  See H.R. 12549, 71st Cong. §§ 1–2, 12, 28–29, 34, 41, 61 (1930); see also H.R. 6988, 71st 
Cong. §§ 1–3 (1929) (authorizing the President to proclaim adherence of the United States to 
international copyright conventions and providing copyright protection for foreign authors).  For 
Pound’s support of Vestal’s proposals, see POUND AND CUTTING, supra note 13, at 28–29, 45–46. 
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Pound passionately believed that communication should not be hampered 
by the monopoly power that copyrights confer.  Undoubtedly influenced by 
the anti-monopoly, royalty campaigns of the nineteenth century, he was a 
copyright free-trader at heart.  Yet he did not feel that the work of dissemination 
could be left to an unfettered public domain, because he believed that authors 
and their heirs were entitled to remuneration for as long as works remained of 
interest to the public, and he worried that the expiration of copyrights created 
unequal competition between past and present writers.  These convictions were 
reinforced by his Romantic conception of the artist and his Locke-like notion 
that authors were entitled to protection for their mental labors. 
Divergent views of the purpose of copyright shaped Pound’s statute as 
they have shaped the history of copyright for two centuries.  We can learn 
from him, as we can from that history, that the law cannot safely continue on a 
course of unqualified maximalist protection for copyright owners.  Pound’s 
attitude toward copyright law was ultimately an instrumental one: He viewed 
authorial rights as a means of furthering international and intergenerational 
communication.  The spread of new translations of authors’ writings, by dint 
of legal compulsion if necessary, would advance a much larger work of trans-
lation—the encouragement of nations, generations, and individuals to translate 
their differences back and forth in a restless, unending encounter with the 
unfamiliar.  If what Pound and Henry James thought of as the labor of translation 
among generations and cultures is to continue today, the law must find a 
better balance between authorial entitlements and the public weal. 




The following text, containing Ezra Pound’s proposals for copyright reform, 
is excerpted from Pound’s Oct. 3, 1918 New Age article, Copyright and Tariff.290 
[ . . . ] The copyright of any book printed anywhere should be and 
remain automatically the author’s.  The author should in return for this 
protection place on file copies of his book at the National Library, 
Washington, and in the municipal libraries of the four largest American 
cities.  Such placing on file of the work should dispose of any further 
dispute over the matter.  (I need hardly point out that said libraries 
would under this system acquire invaluable collections free of cost to 
the public.) 
Copyright from present date should be perpetual. 
In my own case I wish to leave my royalties as a literary endowment.  
I should be able to do this with as much security as if I had acquired oil 
stock, or government bonds, instead of producing literature. 
Secondly, the present law by which copyright expires permits dead 
authors to compete on unjust terms with living authors.  Unscrupulous, 
but well-meaning publishers, well serving the public, print dead authors 
more cheaply than living ones BECAUSE they do not have to pay royalties.  
This is to the disadvantage of contemporary literature, to the disadvantage 
of literary production.  As America has less past literature than other 
countries it is particularly to American disadvantage that the living author 
should not fare as well as the dead one. 
BUT the heirs of an author should be powerless to prevent the 
publication of his works or to extract any excessive royalties. 
If the heirs neglect to keep a man’s work in print and at a price not 
greater than the price of his books during his life, then unauthorised 
publishers should be at liberty to reprint said works, paying to heirs a 
royalty not more than 20 per cent. and not less that 10 per cent. 
BUT the protection of the author should not enable him to play 
dog in the manger. 
IF, having failed to have his works printed in America, or imported 
into America, or translated into American, an American publisher or 
translator apply to said author for permission to publish or translate a given 
work or works, and receive no answer within reasonable time, say six 
months, and if said author do not give notice of intending other 
American publication (quite definitely stating where and when) within 
reasonable time or designate some other translator, then, the first 
                                                                                                                            
 290. Ezra Pound, Copyright and Tariff, NEW AGE, Oct. 3, 1918, at 363, reprinted in 3 EZRA 
POUND’S POETRY AND PROSE CONTRIBUTIONS TO PERIODICALS 208 (Lea Baechler et al. eds., 1991). 
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publisher shall have the right to publish or translate any work, paying to 
the original author a royalty of not more than 20 per cent. and not less 
than 10 per cent. in the case of a foreign work translated.  The original 
author shall have right at law to the minimum of these royalties. 
But no unauthorised translation should inhibit the later publication 
of an authorised translation.  Nevertheless, an authorised translation 
appearing later should not in any way interfere with preceding translations 
save by fair and open competition in the market. 
No perpetual copyright should come into effect without these 
safeguards.  They are very important. 
In addition: 
After a man’s works have sold a certain number of copies, let us 
say 100,000, there should be no means of indefinitely preventing a 
very cheap reissue of his work.  Let us say a shilling a volume.  Royalty 
on same payable at rate of 20 per cent. to author or heirs. [ . . . ] 
